Toolcairn MCP Server
@neurynae/toolcairn-mcp
npm
v1.1.2
Source verified
Published by neurynae — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
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The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:6`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode.process(l,t));let h=new Function(`${yr.default.self}`,`${yr.default.scope}`,l)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-IUBGWDQC.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-IUBGWDQC.js:169`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: {spawn:e}=await import("child_process");try{let n=process.platform,r,s;n==="win32"?(r="cmd",s=["/c","start","",t]):n==="
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-IUBGWDQC.js
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
read_project_configingests untrusted inputsuggest_graph_updateingests untrusted inputcheck_compatibilityno sensitive capabilitycheck_issueno sensitive capabilityclassify_promptno sensitive capabilitycompare_toolsno sensitive capabilityfeedbackno sensitive capabilityget_stackno sensitive capabilityrefine_requirementno sensitive capabilityreport_outcomeno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
search_toolsno sensitive capabilitysearch_tools_respondno sensitive capabilitytoolcairn_authno sensitive capabilitytoolcairn_initno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_configno sensitive capabilityverify_suggestionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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