Network (labeveryday) MCP Server
network-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.2
Published by labeveryday — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/network_mcp/tools/connectivity.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/network_mcp/tools/connectivity.py:132`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/network_mcp/tools/connectivity.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/network_mcp/tools/local.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/network_mcp/tools/local.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/network_mcp/tools/local.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (examples/incident-demo/speak_waveform.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`examples/incident-demo/speak_waveform.py:80`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t) result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, __file__, "--play", audio_path],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server examples/incident-demo/speak_waveform.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_config.py:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: mport os", "exec('print(1)')", "eval('1+1')", "__import__('os')", "os.sy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_config.py
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_dns_trafficno sensitive capabilityanalyze_throughputno sensitive capabilityasn_lookupno sensitive capabilitybatch_dns_lookupno sensitive capabilitybatch_pingno sensitive capabilitybatch_port_checkno sensitive capabilitycapabilitiesno sensitive capabilitycheck_overlapsno sensitive capabilitycidr_infono sensitive capabilitycidr_summarizeno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
custom_scapy_filterno sensitive capabilitydns_lookupno sensitive capabilityfilter_packetsno sensitive capabilityfind_tcp_issuesno sensitive capabilityfind_vlan_for_ipno sensitive capabilityget_arp_tableno sensitive capabilityget_connectionsno sensitive capabilityget_conversationsno sensitive capabilityget_dns_configno sensitive capabilityget_interfacesno sensitive capabilityget_protocol_hierarchyno sensitive capabilityget_public_ipno sensitive capabilityget_routesno sensitive capabilityip_in_subnetno sensitive capabilityip_in_vlanno sensitive capabilitymtrno sensitive capabilitypcap_summaryno sensitive capabilitypingno sensitive capabilityplan_subnetsno sensitive capabilityport_checkno sensitive capabilityrdap_lookupno sensitive capabilitysubnet_splitno sensitive capabilitytracerouteno sensitive capabilityvalidate_vlan_mapno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan network-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Network 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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