Netlens (pzalutski-pixel) MCP Server
netlens-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.3
Published by pzalutski-pixel — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Zero-dependency MCP server for unobstructed web reading: direct browser-header fetch past robots.txt/bot blocks, full-page HTML->Markdown with ad/boilerplate stripping, plus web search
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (npm/bin/netlens-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`npm/bin/netlens-mcp.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } = require("child_process"); const path = require("path"); const SERVER_DIR = path.join(__dirname, "..", "s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/bin/netlens-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/netlens_mcp/fetcher.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/netlens_mcp/fetcher.py:93`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: type}", url] proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True) # binary; we decode ourselves if proc.returncode !
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/netlens_mcp/fetcher.py
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (npm/bin/netlens-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`npm/bin/netlens-mcp.js:16`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const output = execSync(`${cmd} --version`, { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ign
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/bin/netlens-mcp.js
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_fetcher.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_fetcher.py:48`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lse)) res = fetcher.fetch("https://example.com") assert res["html"] == "<html>via urllib</html>" def _no_side_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_fetcher.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/smoke_mcp.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/smoke_mcp.py:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: CHE_TTL="0") proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-m", "netlens_mcp"], stdin=subpro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/smoke_mcp.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.3 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.1.2 |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan netlens-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Netlens 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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