Nebula Notebook MCP Server
nebula-notebook-mcp
npm
v0.4.39
Source verified
Published by jzhoulab — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Nebula Notebook — lets agents (Claude Code, Codex, etc.) read, edit, and execute notebooks on a running Nebula server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (setup-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`setup-mcp.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import readline from 'readline'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.u
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup-mcp.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (setup-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`setup-mcp.js:62`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (command) { try { execSync(`which ${command}`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); return true; } catch { return false
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup-mcp.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.39 latest |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.4.38 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.4.37 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.4.36 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.4.34 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.4.33 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.4.32 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.4.31 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v0.4.30 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
v0.4.29 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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