Nanocart MCP Server
nanocart-mcp
npm
v1.2.0
Published by bytebunny-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Official NanoCart MCP server — manage your NanoCart store (products, orders, coupons, reports, settings) from any MCP-capable AI agent.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_vendor, get_donation_campaign]) co-exist with external-action tools ([update_order]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_vendor, get_donation_campaign] → sinks [update_order]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_vendor → update_order
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_donation_campaigningests untrusted inputget_vendoringests untrusted inputupdate_ordernetwork egressanalytics_funnelno sensitive capabilityarchive_productno sensitive capabilitycreate_categoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_couponno sensitive capabilitycreate_donation_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_productno sensitive capabilitycreate_vendorno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
delete_couponno sensitive capabilitydelete_donation_campaignno sensitive capabilitydelete_vendorno sensitive capabilitydonations_reportno sensitive capabilityget_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_store_infono sensitive capabilityget_storefrontno sensitive capabilityget_tier_usageno sensitive capabilitylist_categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_couponsno sensitive capabilitylist_donation_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylist_donation_supportersno sensitive capabilitylist_donationsno sensitive capabilitylist_ordersno sensitive capabilitylist_productsno sensitive capabilitylist_subscribersno sensitive capabilitylist_vendorsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhook_deliveriesno sensitive capabilityresend_order_confirmationno sensitive capabilitysales_reportno sensitive capabilitysend_order_to_vendorno sensitive capabilitysend_vendor_testno sensitive capabilityupdate_categoryno sensitive capabilityupdate_donation_campaignno sensitive capabilityupdate_productno sensitive capabilityupdate_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_store_configno sensitive capabilityupdate_vendorno sensitive capabilityupload_imageno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.1.0 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v1.0.1 |
A 96/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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