Mysql Mcp Server V1 MCP Server
mysql-mcp-server-v1
npm
v1.2.6
Published by lrferr — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Servidor MCP completo para MySQL Database com sistema hierárquico de configuração, operações DDL, DML, DCL, DDM, DCM, DLM, monitoramento, auditoria e gestão de ciclo de vida de dados
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/mysql-mcp-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/mysql-mcp-cli.js:94`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import('child_process'); execSync('npm run setup', { stdio: 'inherit', cwd: projectRoot });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/mysql-mcp-cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dlm-operations.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/dlm-operations.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); expo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/dlm-operations.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/mcp-server-wrapper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/mcp-server-wrapper.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = dirname
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/mcp-server-wrapper.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/run-mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/run-mcp-server.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = dirname
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/run-mcp-server.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup.js:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import('child_process'); const mysqlVersion = execSync('mysql --version', { encoding: 'utf8' }).tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/ensure-dependencies.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/ensure-dependencies.js:22`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) { try { await import(dep); } catch (error) { missingDependencies.push(dep); } } if (missingDepe
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/ensure-dependencies.js
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_indexesno sensitive capabilityanalyze_tableno sensitive capabilityapply_retention_policyno sensitive capabilityarchive_old_datano sensitive capabilityaudit_user_accessno sensitive capabilitychange_passwordno sensitive capabilitycheck_database_healthno sensitive capabilitycheck_password_policyno sensitive capabilitycheck_sensitive_tablesno sensitive capabilitycompress_tableno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
create_backupno sensitive capabilitycreate_partitionno sensitive capabilitycreate_schemano sensitive capabilitycreate_userno sensitive capabilitydetect_suspicious_activityno sensitive capabilitydrop_partitionno sensitive capabilitydrop_schemano sensitive capabilitydrop_userno sensitive capabilityget_connections_statusno sensitive capabilityget_constraintsno sensitive capabilityget_foreign_keysno sensitive capabilityget_indexesno sensitive capabilityget_table_infono sensitive capabilityget_table_structureno sensitive capabilitygrant_privilegesno sensitive capabilitylist_backupsno sensitive capabilitylist_connectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_privilegesno sensitive capabilitylist_routinesno sensitive capabilitylist_schemasno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_viewsno sensitive capabilitymonitor_schema_changesno sensitive capabilityrestore_backupno sensitive capabilityrevoke_privilegesno sensitive capabilityshow_grantsno sensitive capabilitytest_all_connectionsno sensitive capabilitytest_connectionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.6 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mysql-mcp-server-v1 --onlineMore in Databases
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