Multivon MCP Server
multivon-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.2
Published by multivon-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 41
high Tool "eval_audit_pack" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_audit_pack" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_audit_pack
high Tool "eval_compare_runs" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_compare_runs" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_compare_runs
high Tool "eval_pii_detection" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_pii_detection" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_pii_detection
high Tool "eval_schema_compliance" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_schema_compliance" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_schema_compliance
high Tool "eval_discover" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_discover" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_discover
high Tool "eval_faithfulness" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_faithfulness" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_faithfulness
high Tool "eval_hallucination" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_hallucination" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_hallucination
high Tool "eval_relevance" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_relevance" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_relevance
high Tool "eval_tool_call_accuracy" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_tool_call_accuracy" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_tool_call_accuracy
high Tool "eval_answer_accuracy" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_answer_accuracy" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_answer_accuracy
high Tool "eval_g_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_g_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_g_eval
high Tool "eval_custom_rubric" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_custom_rubric" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_custom_rubric
high Tool "eval_generate_cases" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_generate_cases" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_generate_cases
high Tool "eval_vqa_faithfulness" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_vqa_faithfulness" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_vqa_faithfulness
high Tool "eval_document_grounding" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_document_grounding" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_document_grounding
high Tool "eval_context_precision" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_context_precision" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_context_precision
high Tool "eval_context_recall" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_context_recall" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_context_recall
high Tool "eval_toxicity" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_toxicity" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_toxicity
high Tool "eval_bias" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_bias" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_bias
high Tool "eval_ingest_trace" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "eval_ingest_trace" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool eval_ingest_trace
high Dynamic code execution in server code (multivon_mcp/tools/trace_tools.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`multivon_mcp/tools/trace_tools.py:11`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 4. Agent then runs the eval (e.g. ``eval_tool_call_accuracy``) over the resulting case. The trace is accepted as
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server multivon_mcp/tools/trace_tools.py
low Mutating tool "eval_audit_pack" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_audit_pack" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_audit_pack
low Mutating tool "eval_compare_runs" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_compare_runs" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_compare_runs
low Mutating tool "eval_pii_detection" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_pii_detection" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_pii_detection
low Mutating tool "eval_schema_compliance" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_schema_compliance" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_schema_compliance
low Mutating tool "eval_discover" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_discover" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_discover
low Mutating tool "eval_faithfulness" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_faithfulness" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_faithfulness
low Mutating tool "eval_hallucination" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_hallucination" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_hallucination
low Mutating tool "eval_relevance" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_relevance" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_relevance
low Mutating tool "eval_tool_call_accuracy" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_tool_call_accuracy" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_tool_call_accuracy
low Mutating tool "eval_answer_accuracy" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_answer_accuracy" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_answer_accuracy
low Mutating tool "eval_g_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_g_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_g_eval
low Mutating tool "eval_custom_rubric" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_custom_rubric" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_custom_rubric
low Mutating tool "eval_generate_cases" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_generate_cases" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_generate_cases
low Mutating tool "eval_vqa_faithfulness" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_vqa_faithfulness" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_vqa_faithfulness
low Mutating tool "eval_document_grounding" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_document_grounding" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_document_grounding
low Mutating tool "eval_context_precision" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_context_precision" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_context_precision
low Mutating tool "eval_context_recall" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_context_recall" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_context_recall
low Mutating tool "eval_toxicity" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_toxicity" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_toxicity
low Mutating tool "eval_bias" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_bias" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_bias
low Mutating tool "eval_ingest_trace" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "eval_ingest_trace" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool eval_ingest_trace
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
eval_answer_accuracyruns code / shelleval_audit_packruns code / shelleval_biasruns code / shelleval_compare_runsruns code / shelleval_context_precisionruns code / shelleval_context_recallruns code / shelleval_custom_rubricruns code / shelleval_discoverruns code / shelleval_document_groundingruns code / shelleval_faithfulnessruns code / shell
Show 12 more tools ↓
eval_g_evalruns code / shelleval_generate_casesruns code / shelleval_hallucinationruns code / shelleval_ingest_traceruns code / shelleval_pii_detectionruns code / shelleval_relevanceruns code / shelleval_schema_complianceruns code / shelleval_tool_call_accuracyruns code / shelleval_toxicityruns code / shelleval_vqa_faithfulnessruns code / shellpdfhell_makeno sensitive capabilitypdfhell_runno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 41 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan multivon-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Developer Tools
Security scan results for the 1stay MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adguard Home MCP server.
Security scan results for the Ado Browser MCP server.
Security scan results for the Adobe Experience Dev MCP server.
Security scan results for the Aemet MCP server.
Security scan results for the Affinity Mcp Bridge MCP server.