Multiversx Sc MCP Server
multiversx-sc-mcp
npm
v1.2.2
Published by psorinionut — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/chainsim.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/chainsim.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: och = forceEpoch; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const sdk_core_1 = require("@multiversx/sdk-core");
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/chainsim.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/sc-meta.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/sc-meta.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eproducibleBuild; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs_1 = require("fs"); const path_1 = require("
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/sc-meta.js
Tools 50
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mvx_accountno sensitive capabilitymvx_batch_transfer_egldno sensitive capabilitymvx_batch_transfer_tokensno sensitive capabilitymvx_chainsim_advanceno sensitive capabilitymvx_chainsim_force_epochno sensitive capabilitymvx_chainsim_fundno sensitive capabilitymvx_chainsim_initial_walletsno sensitive capabilitymvx_chainsim_process_txno sensitive capabilitymvx_chainsim_set_keysno sensitive capabilitymvx_chainsim_startno sensitive capability
Show 40 more tools ↓
mvx_chainsim_statusno sensitive capabilitymvx_chainsim_stopno sensitive capabilitymvx_convertno sensitive capabilitymvx_format_amountno sensitive capabilitymvx_native_auth_decodeno sensitive capabilitymvx_native_auth_generateno sensitive capabilitymvx_network_configno sensitive capabilitymvx_relayed_transactionno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_abino sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_buildno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_callno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_compareno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_decodeno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_deployno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_estimate_gasno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_newno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_proxyno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_queryno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_reproducible_buildno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_simulateno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_storageno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_storage_keysno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_testno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_upgradeno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_verifyno sensitive capabilitymvx_sc_verify_statusno sensitive capabilitymvx_searchno sensitive capabilitymvx_setupno sensitive capabilitymvx_sign_messageno sensitive capabilitymvx_token_create_nftno sensitive capabilitymvx_token_infono sensitive capabilitymvx_token_issue_fungibleno sensitive capabilitymvx_token_issue_meta_esdtno sensitive capabilitymvx_token_issue_nftno sensitive capabilitymvx_token_issue_sftno sensitive capabilitymvx_transferno sensitive capabilitymvx_tx_resultno sensitive capabilitymvx_verify_signo sensitive capabilitymvx_wallet_infono sensitive capabilitymvx_wallet_newno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (50 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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