Thinking — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "@multimail/thinking-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@multimail/thinking-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@multimail/thinking-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/embed.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/embed.js:11`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/embed.js"
},
"evidence": "const resp = await fetch(\"https://api.voyageai.com/v1/embeddings\", { method: \"POST\", header",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/embed.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/extract.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/extract.js:33`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/extract.js"
},
"evidence": "const resp = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\", headers",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/extract.js",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get_framing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "seed_framing",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ping",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "capture",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "what_do_i_think",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "what_connects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "what_tensions_exist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "where_am_i_uncertain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_exploration",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "how_would_user_decide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "what_has_changed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "correct",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "record_outcome",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_neighbors",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "merge_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "archive_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bootstrap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "94d23380d1fcd0f80df4fec228d7aea8c922d81e7e70c984160eb5aafad537a7",
"stats": {
"tools": 19,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}