Multimail MCP Server
@multimail/mcp-server
npm
v0.13.0
Published by @multimail — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Give your agent its own email address with graduated human oversight — from full approval to autonomous sending.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([check_inbox, read_email, download_attachment, get_thread]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, update_mailbox, create_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [check_inbox, read_email, download_attachment, get_thread] → sinks [send_email, update_mailbox, create_webhook, delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow check_inbox → send_email
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
check_inboxingests untrusted inputcreate_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressdownload_attachmentingests untrusted inputget_threadingests untrusted inputread_emailingests untrusted inputsend_emailnetwork egressupdate_mailboxnetwork egressactivate_accountno sensitive capabilityadd_allowlist_entryno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
add_contactno sensitive capabilitycancel_messageno sensitive capabilitycancel_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityconfigure_mailboxno sensitive capabilitycreate_accountno sensitive capabilitycreate_api_keyno sensitive capabilitycreate_mailboxno sensitive capabilitydecide_emailno sensitive capabilitydelete_accountno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilitydelete_mailboxno sensitive capabilitydelete_tagno sensitive capabilityedit_scheduled_emailno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_audit_logno sensitive capabilityget_billing_portalno sensitive capabilityget_tagsno sensitive capabilityget_usageno sensitive capabilitylist_allowlistno sensitive capabilitylist_api_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_mailboxesno sensitive capabilitylist_pendingno sensitive capabilitylist_spamno sensitive capabilitylist_suppressionno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitymanage_spam_statusno sensitive capabilitymanage_upgradeno sensitive capabilityremove_allowlist_entryno sensitive capabilityremove_suppressionno sensitive capabilityreply_emailno sensitive capabilityreport_issueno sensitive capabilityrequest_challengeno sensitive capabilityrequest_did_challengeno sensitive capabilityresend_confirmationno sensitive capabilityrevoke_api_keyno sensitive capabilitysearch_contactsno sensitive capabilityset_tagsno sensitive capabilitysetup_multimailno sensitive capabilityupdate_accountno sensitive capabilityupgrade_planno sensitive capabilitywait_for_emailno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.13.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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