Figma Console — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@muloka/figma-console-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@muloka/figma-console-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@muloka/figma-console-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "D",
"score": {
"score": 64,
"threatScore": 75,
"grade": "D",
"band": "D",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 24.85,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (113 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: figma_get_file_at_version → figma_get_token_values → figma_export_tokens. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "figma_get_file_at_version → figma_get_token_values → figma_export_tokens"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"figma_get_file_at_version"
],
"sources": [
"figma_get_token_values"
],
"sinks": [
"figma_export_tokens"
],
"path": [
"figma_get_file_at_version",
"figma_get_token_values",
"figma_export_tokens"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "figma_get_file_at_version",
"to": "figma_get_token_values",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "figma_get_token_values",
"to": "figma_export_tokens",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (figma-desktop-bridge/code.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`figma-desktop-bridge/code.js:519`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "figma-desktop-bridge/code.js"
},
"evidence": "E codePromise = eval(wrappedCode); } catch (syntaxError) { // Log the actual syntax error message",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "figma-desktop-bridge/code.js",
"line": 519,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"title": "Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`figma-desktop-bridge/code.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code. These two sinks are in different files — confirm whether they are actually connected, or are unrelated code paths (e.g. a vendored bundle plus a CLI wrapper).",
"remediation": "Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "implementation"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rules": [
"MTC-SRC-009",
"MTC-SRC-010"
],
"commandFile": "dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js",
"evalFile": "figma-desktop-bridge/code.js",
"sameFile": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (figma-desktop-bridge/code.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`figma-desktop-bridge/code.js:519`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "figma-desktop-bridge/code.js"
},
"evidence": "E codePromise = eval(wrappedCode); } catch (syntaxError) { // Log the actual syntax error message",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "figma-desktop-bridge/code.js",
"line": 519,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js"
},
"evidence": "e, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { createChildLogger } from './logger.js",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js",
"line": 35,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/port-discovery.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/port-discovery.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/port-discovery.js"
},
"evidence": "e, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { createChildLogger } from './logger.js",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/core/port-discovery.js",
"line": 35,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cloudflare/core/cloud-websocket-connector.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cloudflare/core/cloud-websocket-connector.js:16`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cloudflare/core/cloud-websocket-connector.js"
},
"evidence": "= await this.relayStub.fetch('https://relay/relay/status'); const status = await res.json(); if (!statu",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/cloudflare/core/cloud-websocket-connector.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cloudflare/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cloudflare/index.js:49`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cloudflare/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.figma.com/v1/me\", { headers: { \"X-Figma-Token\": token },",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/cloudflare/index.js",
"line": 49,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js:328`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js"
},
"evidence": "'); const out = execSync(`ps -p ${pid} -o etime= 2>/dev/null`, { encoding: 'utf-8', time",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/cloudflare/core/port-discovery.js",
"line": 328,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/core/port-discovery.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/core/port-discovery.js:388`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/core/port-discovery.js"
},
"evidence": "'); const out = execSync(`ps -p ${pid} -o etime= 2>/dev/null`, { encoding: 'utf-8', time",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/core/port-discovery.js",
"line": 388,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"figma_get_file_at_version"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"figma_get_token_values"
],
"externalSink": [
"figma_export_tokens"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"figma_get_file_at_version",
"figma_get_token_values",
"figma_export_tokens"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: figma_get_file_at_version → figma_get_token_values → figma_export_tokens."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "figma_scan_code_accessibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_annotations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_annotations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_annotation_categories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_post_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_delete_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_component_for_development_deep",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_analyze_component_set",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_check_design_parity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_generate_component_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_design_system_kit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_diagnose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_create_sticky",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_create_stickies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_create_connector",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_create_shape_with_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_create_section",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_create_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_create_code_block",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_auto_arrange",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_get_board_contents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figjam_get_connections",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_file_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_component",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_styles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_component_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_component_for_development",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_file_for_plugin",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_capture_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_instance_properties",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_library_component_by_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_library_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_import_library_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_list_slides",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_slide_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_slide_grid",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_slide_transition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_text_styles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_focused_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_delete_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_duplicate_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_reorder_slides",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_slide_transition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_skip_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_add_text_to_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_add_shape_to_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_slide_background",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_slides_view_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_focus_slide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_slot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_slots",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_append_to_slot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_reset_slot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_add_slot_property",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_export_tokens",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"export_to\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "figma_import_tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_file_versions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_file_at_version",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "figma_diff_versions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_get_changes_since_version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_generate_changelog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_blame_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_update_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_create_variable_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_delete_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_delete_variable_collection",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_rename_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_add_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_rename_mode",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_batch_create_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_batch_update_variables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_setup_design_tokens",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_instantiate_component",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_description",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_add_component_property",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_edit_component_property",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_delete_component_property",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_resize_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_move_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_fills",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_image_fill",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_set_strokes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_clone_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_delete_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "figma_rename_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
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