Msfeldstein Test Servers MCP Server

@msfeldstein/mcp-test-servers npm v1.1.72

Published by @msfeldstein — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

A collection of MCP test servers including working servers (ping, resource, combined, env-echo) and test failure cases (broken-tool, crash-on-startup)

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 92/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/shell-exec-server.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/shell-exec-server.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: t { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); const ser

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/shell-exec-server.js

medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/cli.js)MTC-SRC-005

In the server's implementation (`src/cli.js:34`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: cute the Node.js server import(serverConfig.file);

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/cli.js

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/oauth-debug-setup.js)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/oauth-debug-setup.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'fs'; import { join, dirname } from 'path'; import

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/oauth-debug-setup.js

Tools 67

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • execute-sqlreads sensitive data
  • addno sensitive capability
  • all_types_toolno sensitive capability
  • analyze_textno sensitive capability
  • another-missing-typeno sensitive capability
  • ask-favorite-colorno sensitive capability
  • ask-nameno sensitive capability
  • ask-programming-languageno sensitive capability
  • bad-paramno sensitive capability
  • bug-statusno sensitive capability
Show 57 more tools ↓
  • crashno sensitive capability
  • debug-oauthno sensitive capability
  • delayedPingno sensitive capability
  • delete-projectno sensitive capability
  • divideno sensitive capability
  • dynamic_featureno sensitive capability
  • echono sensitive capability
  • echo_env_varno sensitive capability
  • echo_mcp_rootsno sensitive capability
  • echo_structuredno sensitive capability
  • echo_with_paramsno sensitive capability
  • env_echono sensitive capability
  • factorialno sensitive capability
  • fizzbuzzno sensitive capability
  • format_datano sensitive capability
  • generate_big_responseno sensitive capability
  • generate_imageno sensitive capability
  • get_mixed_resourcesno sensitive capability
  • get-headersno sensitive capability
  • get-infono sensitive capability
  • get-resource-listno sensitive capability
  • get-session-infono sensitive capability
  • get-timeno sensitive capability
  • log-to-stderrno sensitive capability
  • long_running_progressno sensitive capability
  • long-running-pingno sensitive capability
  • long-running-taskno sensitive capability
  • long-running-task-with-messageno sensitive capability
  • long-running-task-with-no-totalno sensitive capability
  • makeRequestno sensitive capability
  • many-resources-toolno sensitive capability
  • missing-type-toolno sensitive capability
  • multi-step-elicitationno sensitive capability
  • multiplyno sensitive capability
  • number-paramno sensitive capability
  • optionalToolno sensitive capability
  • parse_bugsnag_error_urlno sensitive capability
  • pingno sensitive capability
  • powerno sensitive capability
  • root-echono sensitive capability
  • safe_header_infono sensitive capability
  • search_documentationno sensitive capability
  • simple_pingno sensitive capability
  • sqrtno sensitive capability
  • start-notification-streamno sensitive capability
  • statusno sensitive capability
  • subtractno sensitive capability
  • terminate-sessionno sensitive capability
  • test_all_elicitationsno sensitive capability
  • test-anyof-integerno sensitive capability
  • test-both-paramsno sensitive capability
  • test-edge-casesno sensitive capability
  • test-simple-integerno sensitive capability
  • toggle_dynamic_toolno sensitive capability
  • toggleToolno sensitive capability
  • token-infono sensitive capability
  • whoamino sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.1.72 latest A 92/100 3 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @msfeldstein/mcp-test-servers --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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