Obsidian (mseep) MCP Server
@mseep/obsidian-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.0
Published by @mseep — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Obsidian vault integration with Claude Desktop
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Shell/command execution in server code (obsidian-ai-curator-plugin/src/claude-cli-wrapper.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`obsidian-ai-curator-plugin/src/claude-cli-wrapper.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { EventEmitter } from 'events'; export interface ClaudeCliOptions { mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server obsidian-ai-curator-plugin/src/claude-cli-wrapper.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (obsidian-ai-curator-plugin/src/git-service.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`obsidian-ai-curator-plugin/src/git-service.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { App } from 'obsidian'; export class GitService { private vaultPath:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server obsidian-ai-curator-plugin/src/git-service.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/claude-code-executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/claude-code-executor.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; import path from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/claude-code-executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/github/github-integration.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/github/github-integration.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; import path from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/github/github-integration.js
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-claude-headless.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-claude-headless.js:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('util'); const execAsync = promisify
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-claude-headless.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-github-integration.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-github-integration.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); // Colors
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-github-integration.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-local-claude.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-local-claude.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); // Colors
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test-local-claude.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/run-tests.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/run-tests.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import path from 'path'; import fs from 'fs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/run-tests.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (test/test-status.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`test/test-status.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; console.log(` ╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test/test-status.js
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
move_filewrites filesadd_daily_taskno sensitive capabilityanalyze_tagsno sensitive capabilityappend_to_daily_noteno sensitive capabilityarchive_notesno sensitive capabilitycheck_claude_code_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_issue_statusno sensitive capabilitycleanup_temp_directoriesno sensitive capabilitycreate_bug_reportno sensitive capabilitycreate_feature_requestno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
create_github_issueno sensitive capabilitydocument_design_decisionno sensitive capabilityexecute_claude_code_featureno sensitive capabilityexecute_claude_code_fixno sensitive capabilityfind_by_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_daily_noteno sensitive capabilityget_tag_taxonomyno sensitive capabilityget_tagsno sensitive capabilitygit_changesno sensitive capabilitygit_checkpointno sensitive capabilitygit_rollbackno sensitive capabilityinit_projectno sensitive capabilitylist_playbooksno sensitive capabilitylist_project_templatesno sensitive capabilityread_notesno sensitive capabilityrename_fileno sensitive capabilitysearch_contentno sensitive capabilitysuggest_tagsno sensitive capabilityupdate_frontmatterno sensitive capabilityupdate_tagsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_tagsno sensitive capabilityvault_scanno sensitive capabilityview_performance_metricsno sensitive capabilitywrite_noteno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @mseep/obsidian-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Obsidian 37
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 38 side by side →
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