Mousainote Claude — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "mousainote-claude-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mousainote-claude-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "mousainote-claude-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"create_mousai_memo\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"create_mousai_memo\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "create_mousai_memo"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"upload_mousai_file\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"upload_mousai_file\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "upload_mousai_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([create_mousai_memo, upload_mousai_file]) and tools that can send data out ([create_mousai_memo, upload_mousai_file]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"create_mousai_memo",
"upload_mousai_file"
],
"sinks": [
"create_mousai_memo",
"upload_mousai_file"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"create_mousai_memo\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_mousai_memo\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_mousai_memo",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"fileName\" on \"create_mousai_memo\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"create_mousai_memo\" takes a path parameter \"fileName\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "create_mousai_memo",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.fileName"
},
"data": {
"param": "fileName"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"upload_mousai_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"upload_mousai_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "upload_mousai_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"fileName\" on \"upload_mousai_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"upload_mousai_file\" takes a path parameter \"fileName\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "upload_mousai_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.fileName"
},
"data": {
"param": "fileName"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"create_mousai_memo"
],
"externalSink": [
"create_mousai_memo"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"create_mousai_memo\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
},
{
"id": "flow-2",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"upload_mousai_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"upload_mousai_file"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"upload_mousai_file\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
},
{
"id": "flow-3",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"create_mousai_memo",
"upload_mousai_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"create_mousai_memo",
"upload_mousai_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"create_mousai_memo",
"upload_mousai_file"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: create_mousai_memo → upload_mousai_file."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "create_mousai_memo",
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "upload_mousai_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_mousai_folders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_mousai_memos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_mousai_memos",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_mousai_memo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_mousai_memo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_mousai_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "move_mousai_memo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_mousai_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "7f0742edd7f79dd2e9b9b2a5a6f7343ba9ee16c5b7f47af41aaa37f322ab29b5",
"stats": {
"tools": 10,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 0,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}