Mosadd MCP Server
@mosadd/mcp
npm
v3.0.0-alpha.47
Published by @mosadd — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for mosadd. Exposes 4 modules (mDM, mIRC, mURL, mAYL) and capabilities (mTALK, mRAG) plus comms agent-actions — 69 tools — to any agent runtime (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline, ChatGPT Apps, Lovable, Bolt, Goose, Manus,
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/observability/sentry.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/observability/sentry.ts:34`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst Sentry: any = await import(spec).catch(() => null); if (!Sentry) return; Sentry.init({ dsn: DSN,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/observability/sentry.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/__tests__/integration.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/__tests__/integration.test.ts:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ullStreams } from "node:child_process"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, ex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/__tests__/integration.test.ts
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.0-alpha.47 latest |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v3.0.0-alpha.45 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v3.0.0-alpha.34 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v3.0.0-alpha.32 |
A 99/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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