Morningljn Session Insight MCP Server
@morningljn/mcp-session-insight
npm
v0.5.10
Published by @morningljn — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP Server for Claude Code Session Insight — structured data extraction, git log collection, and LLM synthesis guidance
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 15.4 = 85. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Tool-selection hijack MTC-INJ-SHADOW-3 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 85 − 8 = 77. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Tool-selection hijack (suppress all other tools)MTC-INJ-SHADOW-3
Tool-selection hijack (suppress all other tools) detected in the description of tool "get_session_summary". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.
Evidence: Do NOT call other tool
Fix: Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.
Location: tool get_session_summary · description
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/git.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readdirSync, statSync, existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join, basename
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git.js
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
All Sessionsno sensitive capabilitycollect_project_sessionsno sensitive capabilityget_git_logsno sensitive capabilityget_session_changesno sensitive capabilityget_session_conversationno sensitive capabilityget_session_decisionsno sensitive capabilityget_session_errorsno sensitive capabilityget_session_requestsno sensitive capabilityget_session_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_session_todosno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
list_sessionsno sensitive capabilitysearch_sessionsno sensitive capabilitysession_handoffno sensitive capabilitysession_idno sensitive capabilityshow_sessionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.10 latest |
C 77/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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