Slack (monsoft) MCP Server
@monsoft/mcp-slack
npm
v0.5.0
Published by @monsoft — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Slack MCP Server for Model Context Protocol
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([slack_list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([slack_post_message, slack_post_rich_message, slack_upload_file, slack_upload_file_content]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [slack_list_files] → sinks [slack_post_message, slack_post_rich_message, slack_upload_file, slack_upload_file_content]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow slack_list_files → slack_post_message
medium Tool "slack_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "slack_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool slack_delete_file
low Mutating tool "slack_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "slack_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool slack_delete_file
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
slack_delete_filewrites filesslack_list_filesreads sensitive dataslack_post_messagenetwork egressslack_post_rich_messagenetwork egressslack_upload_filenetwork egressslack_upload_file_contentnetwork egressslack_add_reactionno sensitive capabilityslack_archive_channelno sensitive capabilityslack_create_channelno sensitive capabilityslack_delete_messageno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
slack_disable_public_urlno sensitive capabilityslack_enable_public_urlno sensitive capabilityslack_get_channel_historyno sensitive capabilityslack_get_channel_infono sensitive capabilityslack_get_file_infono sensitive capabilityslack_get_thread_repliesno sensitive capabilityslack_get_user_profileno sensitive capabilityslack_get_usersno sensitive capabilityslack_invite_to_channelno sensitive capabilityslack_list_channelsno sensitive capabilityslack_reply_to_threadno sensitive capabilityslack_schedule_messageno sensitive capabilityslack_share_fileno sensitive capabilityslack_unarchive_channelno sensitive capabilityslack_update_messageno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @monsoft/mcp-slack --onlineOther implementations of Slack 29
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 30 side by side →
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