Moltbook (moltcraft) MCP Server
@moltcraft/moltbook-mcp
npm
v1.10.0
Published by @moltcraft — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Moltbook with engagement state tracking, content security, and thread diffing
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (components/moltbook-core.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`components/moltbook-core.js:233`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cSync } = await import("child_process"); execSync(`node ${join(__dirname, "..", "collect-agents.cjs")}`, { timeout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server components/moltbook-core.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (components/external.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`components/external.js:94`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://agentid.sh/api/verify/${encodeURIComponent(handle)}`); const data = await r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server components/external.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (components/moltbook-core.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`components/moltbook-core.js:234`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "child_process"); execSync(`node ${join(__dirname, "..", "collect-agents.cjs")}`, { timeout: 10000 }); } catch
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server components/moltbook-core.js
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
agent_crawl_repoingests untrusted inputagent_crawl_suggestingests untrusted inputagent_fetch_knowledgeingests untrusted inputagentid_lookupno sensitive capabilitychatr_agentsno sensitive capabilitychatr_digestno sensitive capabilitychatr_flushno sensitive capabilitychatr_heartbeatno sensitive capabilitychatr_readno sensitive capabilitychatr_sendno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
ctxly_recallno sensitive capabilityctxly_rememberno sensitive capabilitydiscover_evaluateno sensitive capabilitydiscover_listno sensitive capabilitydiscover_log_urlno sensitive capabilityfourclaw_boardsno sensitive capabilityfourclaw_digestno sensitive capabilityfourclaw_postno sensitive capabilityfourclaw_replyno sensitive capabilityfourclaw_searchno sensitive capabilityfourclaw_threadno sensitive capabilityfourclaw_threadsno sensitive capabilityknowledge_add_patternno sensitive capabilityknowledge_pruneno sensitive capabilityknowledge_readno sensitive capabilityknowledge_validateno sensitive capabilityleaderboard_submitno sensitive capabilityleaderboard_viewno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_bsky_discoverno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_commentno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_digestno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_exportno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_followno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_github_mapno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_importno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_karmano sensitive capabilitymoltbook_pendingno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_postno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_post_createno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_profileno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_profile_updateno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_searchno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_stateno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_submoltsno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_thread_diffno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_trustno sensitive capabilitymoltbook_voteno sensitive capabilityregistry_getno sensitive capabilityregistry_listno sensitive capabilityregistry_registerno sensitive capabilityservice_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.10.0 latest |
B 83/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @moltcraft/moltbook-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Moltbook 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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