@molanojustin/smithsonian-mcp
npm
v1.2.9
Published by @molanojustin — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Smithsonian Open Access collections
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`bin/smithsonian-mcp.js:58`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const sync = spawn('uv', ['sync'], { stdio: 'inherit', cwd: this.packagePath });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/smithsonian-mcp.js
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/verify-setup.py:198`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ce result = subprocess.run( ["systemctl", "--user", "is-active", service_name],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/verify-setup.py
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/verify-setup.py:95`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __import__(import_name) except ImportError: missing.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/verify-setup.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
check_museum_has_object_typeno sensitive capabilitycontinue_exploreno sensitive capabilityfind_and_describeno sensitive capabilityfind_on_view_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_collection_statisticsno sensitive capabilityget_first_object_idno sensitive capabilityget_museum_collection_typesno sensitive capabilityget_museum_highlights_on_viewno sensitive capabilityget_object_contextno sensitive capabilityget_object_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_object_idsno sensitive capabilityget_object_urlno sensitive capabilityget_objects_on_viewno sensitive capabilityget_on_view_contextno sensitive capabilityget_search_contextno sensitive capabilityget_smithsonian_unitsno sensitive capabilityget_stats_contextno sensitive capabilityget_units_contextno sensitive capabilityresolve_museum_nameno sensitive capabilitysearch_and_get_detailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_and_get_first_detailsno sensitive capabilitysearch_and_get_first_urlno sensitive capabilitysearch_by_unitno sensitive capabilitysearch_collectionsno sensitive capabilitysimple_exploreno sensitive capabilitysimple_searchno sensitive capabilitysummarize_search_resultsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_object_idno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.9 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @molanojustin/smithsonian-mcp --online
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
Search 14.5M Smithsonian Open Access objects across 20+ museums via MCP, and retrieve CC0 images for the 5.2M that carry openly-licensed media. STDIO or Streamable HTTP.
Smithsonian Open Access MCP.
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MCP server for searching the Agent Almanac — the public catalog of 9,000+ Model Context Protocol servers. Find, install, and discover MCP servers from inside Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, Zed, or any MCP-aware agent.
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