Fork Parity MCP Server
@moikas/fork-parity-mcp
npm
v2.0.1
Source verified
Published by moikas-code — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for tracking fork parity with upstream repositories
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11.7 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11.7 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×4 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 6 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (fork-parity-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`fork-parity-server.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; class EnhancedForkParityServer { constructor() { this.server = new Server
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server fork-parity-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/advanced-analysis-old.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/advanced-analysis-old.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join, extname, dirname }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/advanced-analysis-old.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/advanced-analysis.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/advanced-analysis.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join, extname, dirname }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/advanced-analysis.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; class ForkParityManager { constructor() { this.db = new ForkParityDatabas
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/enhanced-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/enhanced-server.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; class EnhancedForkParityServer { constructor() { this.server = new Server
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/enhanced-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/github-actions.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/github-actions.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; class GitHubActionsIntegration { constructor() { this.workflowTemplates =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/github-actions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/integration-helpers.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/integration-helpers.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync, existsSync, writeFileSync } from 'fs'; import { join, dir
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/integration-helpers.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/notifications.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/notifications.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from 'fs'; import { join } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/notifications.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (fork-parity-server.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`fork-parity-server.js:678`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const logOutput = execSync( `git log ${commit_range} --pretty=format:"%H|%an|%ae|%ad|%s" --date=iso --name
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server fork-parity-server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.js:42`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: h { try { execSync(`git remote add upstream ${upstreamUrl}`, { stdio: 'ignore' }); console.log('✅
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/enhanced-server.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/enhanced-server.js:678`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const logOutput = execSync( `git log ${commit_range} --pretty=format:"%H|%an|%ae|%ad|%s" --date=iso --name
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/enhanced-server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/integration-helpers.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/integration-helpers.js:498`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e.now()}`; execSync(`git checkout -b ${tempBranch}`, { cwd: repositoryPath, stdio: 'ignore' });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/integration-helpers.js
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fork_parity_send_notificationnetwork egressfork_parity_setup_github_actionsnetwork egressfork_parity_advanced_analysisno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_auto_triage_commitsno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_batch_analyze_commitsno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_conflict_analysisno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_create_review_templateno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_generate_dashboardno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_generate_integration_planno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_get_actionable_itemsno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
fork_parity_get_detailed_statusno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_learn_adaptationno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_migration_planno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_setup_notificationsno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_sync_and_analyzeno sensitive capabilityfork_parity_update_commit_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.1 latest |
B 82/100 | 12 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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