Mobile (mobilenext) MCP Server
@mobilenext/mobile-mcp
npm
v1.0.2
Source verified
Published by mobile-next — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Mobile MCP
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/android.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/android.js:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode:path")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_fs_1 = require("node:fs"); const xml
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/android.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/image-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/image-utils.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: sformer = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const node_os_1 = __importDefault(require("node:os")
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/image-utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/ios.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/ios.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "node:net"); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const webdriver_agent_1 = require("./webdriver-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/ios.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/iphone-simulator.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/iphone-simulator.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tl = void 0; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const node_fs_1 = require("node:fs"); const nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/iphone-simulator.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/mobilecli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/mobilecli.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: node:path"); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const TIMEOUT = 30000; const MAX_BUFFER_SIZE =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/mobilecli.js
Tools 1
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mobile_take_screenshotno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.0.1 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v1.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v0.0.62 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @mobilenext/mobile-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Mobile 2
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