Mobile Mcp Ai MCP Server
mobile-mcp-ai
PyPI
v2.7.17
Published by test111ddff-hash — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_mcp/core/basic_tools_lite.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_mcp/core/basic_tools_lite.py:1191`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ''' subprocess.run(["osascript", "-e", script], check=True) time.sleep(0.3)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_mcp/core/basic_tools_lite.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_mcp/core/device_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_mcp/core/device_manager.py:80`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run(['adb', 'version'], capture_output=True, timeout=2) if result.returnc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_mcp/core/device_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_mcp/core/ios_device_manager_wda.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_mcp/core/ios_device_manager_wda.py:84`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ce result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, '-m', 'tidevice', 'list', '--json'],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_mcp/core/ios_device_manager_wda.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_mcp/core/mobile_client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_mcp/core/mobile_client.py:97`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: # 先禁用自动旋转 subprocess.run( ['adb', '-s', device_id, 'shell', 'settings', 'put', 'system', '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_mcp/core/mobile_client.py
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mobile_assert_textno sensitive capabilitymobile_assert_toastno sensitive capabilitymobile_check_connectionno sensitive capabilitymobile_clear_operation_historyno sensitive capabilitymobile_click_by_boundsno sensitive capabilitymobile_click_by_idno sensitive capabilitymobile_click_by_percentno sensitive capabilitymobile_click_by_somno sensitive capabilitymobile_click_by_textno sensitive capabilitymobile_close_popupno sensitive capability
Show 26 more tools ↓
mobile_drag_progress_barno sensitive capabilitymobile_find_nearbyno sensitive capabilitymobile_generate_test_scriptno sensitive capabilitymobile_get_clipboardno sensitive capabilitymobile_get_current_appno sensitive capabilitymobile_hide_keyboardno sensitive capabilitymobile_input_text_by_idno sensitive capabilitymobile_launch_appno sensitive capabilitymobile_list_appsno sensitive capabilitymobile_list_devicesno sensitive capabilitymobile_list_elementsno sensitive capabilitymobile_long_press_by_idno sensitive capabilitymobile_long_press_by_textno sensitive capabilitymobile_open_deep_linkno sensitive capabilitymobile_open_new_chatno sensitive capabilitymobile_press_keyno sensitive capabilitymobile_screenshot_with_somno sensitive capabilitymobile_set_clipboardno sensitive capabilitymobile_start_screen_recordno sensitive capabilitymobile_start_toast_watchno sensitive capabilitymobile_stop_screen_recordno sensitive capabilitymobile_swipeno sensitive capabilitymobile_take_screenshotno sensitive capabilitymobile_template_addno sensitive capabilitymobile_terminate_appno sensitive capabilitymobile_waitno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.7.17 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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