Mobile Device (saranshbamania) MCP Server
mobile-device-mcp
npm
v0.2.9
Published by saranshbamania — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that gives AI coding assistants (Claude, Cursor, Windsurf) the ability to see and interact with Android mobile devices via ADB — AI-powered visual inspection, element finding, and device automation
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/android/adb.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/android/adb.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as spawnCb } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFile = promisify(execFileCb); /
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/android/adb.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/drivers/ios/simctl.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/drivers/ios/simctl.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFileCb } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFile = promisify(execFileCb); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/drivers/ios/simctl.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/discovery.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/discovery.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execFileCb } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; imp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/discovery.js
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_logsreads sensitive dataanalyze_screenno sensitive capabilitydouble_tapno sensitive capabilityextract_textno sensitive capabilityfill_formno sensitive capabilityfind_elementno sensitive capabilityflutter_connectno sensitive capabilityflutter_debug_paintno sensitive capabilityflutter_disconnectno sensitive capabilityflutter_find_widgetno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
flutter_get_source_mapno sensitive capabilityflutter_get_widget_detailsno sensitive capabilityflutter_get_widget_treeno sensitive capabilityflutter_hot_reloadno sensitive capabilityflutter_hot_restartno sensitive capabilityflutter_screenshot_widgetno sensitive capabilityget_current_appno sensitive capabilityget_device_infono sensitive capabilityget_recorded_actionsno sensitive capabilityget_screen_sizeno sensitive capabilityget_ui_elementsno sensitive capabilityhandle_popupno sensitive capabilityinstall_appno sensitive capabilityios_boot_simulatorno sensitive capabilityios_list_simulatorsno sensitive capabilityios_screenshotno sensitive capabilityios_shutdown_simulatorno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylong_pressno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilityrecord_screenno sensitive capabilitysmart_tapno sensitive capabilitysmart_typeno sensitive capabilitystart_test_recordingno sensitive capabilitystop_appno sensitive capabilitystop_recordingno sensitive capabilitystop_test_recordingno sensitive capabilitysuggest_actionsno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytapno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityuninstall_appno sensitive capabilityverify_screenno sensitive capabilityvisual_diffno sensitive capabilitywait_for_elementno sensitive capabilitywait_for_settleno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.9 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mobile-device-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Mobile Device 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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