Mnehmos.ooda.mcp MCP Server
mnehmos.ooda.mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by mnehmos — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for full computer control - OODA loop enabled. CLI, CRUD, Filesystem, Screen capture, Input simulation, Window management, Clipboard, and System operations.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 30
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_page_content → batch_read_files → batch_exec_cli. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_page_content → batch_read_files → batch_exec_cli
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/tools/browser/providers/puppeteerProvider.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/browser/providers/puppeteerProvider.js:76`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: line return eval(code); }, script); } async screenshot() { if (!this.page)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/browser/providers/puppeteerProvider.js
high Tool "exec_cli" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_cli" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_cli
high Tool "execute_code" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_code" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute code" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_code
high Tool "batch_exec_cli" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "batch_exec_cli" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool batch_exec_cli
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/browser/providers/puppeteerProvider.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/browser/providers/puppeteerProvider.js:76`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: line return eval(code); }, script); } async screenshot() { if (!this.page)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/browser/providers/puppeteerProvider.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/cli.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path'; import { loadConfig } from '../con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/clipboard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/clipboard.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import os from 'os'; import fs from 'fs'; impo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/clipboard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/executeCode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/executeCode.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { logAudit } from '../audit.js'; import { loadConfig } from '../config.js
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/executeCode.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/input.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/input.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import os from 'os'; import { logAudit } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/input.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/screen.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/screen.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import fs from 'fs'; import path from 'path';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/screen.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/sessions.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/sessions.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { logAudit } from '../audit.js'; import { loadConfig } from '../config.js
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/sessions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/system.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/system.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import os from 'os'; import { logAudit } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/system.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/window.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/window.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import os from 'os'; import { logAudit } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/window.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/powerShellSession.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/powerShellSession.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; export class PowerShellSession { static instance; process = null; bu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/powerShellSession.js
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
medium Tool "batch_write_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "batch_write_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool batch_write_files
medium Tool "batch_move_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "batch_move_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool batch_move_files
medium Tool "batch_delete_files" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "batch_delete_files" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool batch_delete_files
low Mutating tool "exec_cli" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_cli" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_cli
low Mutating tool "execute_code" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_code" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_code
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "batch_exec_cli" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "batch_exec_cli" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool batch_exec_cli
low Mutating tool "batch_write_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "batch_write_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool batch_write_files
low Mutating tool "batch_move_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "batch_move_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool batch_move_files
low Mutating tool "batch_delete_files" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "batch_delete_files" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool batch_delete_files
Tools 100
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
batch_delete_fileswrites filesbatch_exec_cliruns code / shellbatch_move_fileswrites filesbatch_read_filesreads sensitive databatch_toolsreads sensitive databatch_write_fileswrites filesdelete_filewrites filesexec_cliruns code / shellexecute_coderuns code / shellget_environmentreads sensitive data
Show 90 more tools ↓
get_page_contentingests untrusted inputmove_filewrites filesread_filereads sensitive dataread_file_linesreads sensitive dataread_process_outputingests untrusted inputwrite_filewrites filesapply_diffno sensitive capabilitybatch_copy_filesno sensitive capabilitybatch_edit_blocksno sensitive capabilitybatch_file_infono sensitive capabilitybatch_keyboard_actionsno sensitive capabilitybatch_list_directoriesno sensitive capabilitybatch_mouse_actionsno sensitive capabilitybatch_search_in_filesno sensitive capabilitybatch_str_replaceno sensitive capabilityclear_old_logsno sensitive capabilityclick_elementno sensitive capabilityclipboard_clearno sensitive capabilityclipboard_has_formatno sensitive capabilityclipboard_readno sensitive capabilityclipboard_writeno sensitive capabilityclose_browserno sensitive capabilityclose_windowno sensitive capabilitycopy_fileno sensitive capabilitycrud_batch_createno sensitive capabilitycrud_batch_deleteno sensitive capabilitycrud_batch_readno sensitive capabilitycrud_batch_updateno sensitive capabilitycrud_createno sensitive capabilitycrud_deleteno sensitive capabilitycrud_queryno sensitive capabilitycrud_readno sensitive capabilitycrud_updateno sensitive capabilityedit_blockno sensitive capabilityevaluate_jsno sensitive capabilityfile_infono sensitive capabilityfind_on_screenno sensitive capabilityfocus_windowno sensitive capabilityget_active_windowno sensitive capabilityget_audit_log_statsno sensitive capabilityget_configno sensitive capabilityget_console_logsno sensitive capabilityget_diff_previewno sensitive capabilityget_mouse_positionno sensitive capabilityget_network_infono sensitive capabilityget_recent_tool_callsno sensitive capabilityget_screen_infono sensitive capabilityget_search_resultsno sensitive capabilityget_system_infono sensitive capabilityget_usage_statsno sensitive capabilityinteract_with_processno sensitive capabilitykeyboard_pressno sensitive capabilitykeyboard_shortcutno sensitive capabilitykeyboard_typeno sensitive capabilitykill_processno sensitive capabilitylaunch_applicationno sensitive capabilitylaunch_browserno sensitive capabilitylist_active_searchesno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_processesno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_windowsno sensitive capabilitymaximize_windowno sensitive capabilityminimize_windowno sensitive capabilitymouse_clickno sensitive capabilitymouse_dragno sensitive capabilitymouse_moveno sensitive capabilitymouse_scrollno sensitive capabilitymove_windowno sensitive capabilitynavigate_pageno sensitive capabilitynotifyno sensitive capabilityreset_configno sensitive capabilityresize_windowno sensitive capabilityrestore_windowno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_pageno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_in_fileno sensitive capabilityset_config_valueno sensitive capabilityset_environmentno sensitive capabilitystart_processno sensitive capabilitystart_searchno sensitive capabilitystop_searchno sensitive capabilitystr_replaceno sensitive capabilityterminate_processno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywaitno sensitive capabilitywait_for_screen_changeno sensitive capabilitywait_for_windowno sensitive capabilitywrite_from_lineno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (100 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 30 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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