Mmnto MCP Server
@mmnto/mcp
npm
v2.1.0
Source verified
Published by mmnto-ai — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Totem, the local-first toolkit that keeps AI-agent work queryable, enforceable, and derivable as plain files in your codebase
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/add-lesson.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/add-lesson.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import * as fs from 'node:fs'; import * as path from 'node:path'; import { z } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/add-lesson.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/verify-execution.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/verify-execution.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { z } from 'zod'; import { getContext } from '../context.js'; import { de
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/verify-execution.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/context.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/context.js:132`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = (await jiti.import(configPath)); const raw = mod['default'] ?? mod; return TotemConfigSchema.parse(r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/context.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/tools/describe-project.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/describe-project.js:56`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const mod = (await jiti.import(configPath)); const raw = mod['default'] ?? mod; const config = TotemConfigSchema
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/describe-project.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/state-extractors.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/state-extractors.test.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import * as fs from 'node:fs'; import * as os from 'node:os'; import * as path f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/state-extractors.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/add-lesson.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/add-lesson.test.js:62`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ly spawns vi.mock('node:child_process', () => { const { EventEmitter } = require('node:events'); return {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/add-lesson.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/verify-execution.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/verify-execution.test.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }; }); vi.mock('node:child_process', () => { const { EventEmitter } = require('node:events'); return {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/verify-execution.test.js
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_lessonno sensitive capabilitydescribe_projectno sensitive capabilitysearch_knowledgeno sensitive capabilityverify_executionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v1.124.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.121.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.120.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v1.119.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-25 |
v1.118.1 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v1.118.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v1.116.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v1.115.0 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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