Mitmproxy — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "mitmproxy-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "mitmproxy-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "mitmproxy-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_generate_scraper_code.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_generate_scraper_code.py:236`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_generate_scraper_code.py"
},
"evidence": "//evil.com'; import os; os.system('whoami'); #\" def fake_get_flow_detail(fid): if fid != flow_id:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_generate_scraper_code.py",
"line": 236,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "start_proxy",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "stop_proxy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_scope",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_global_header",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_global_header",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_traffic_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_flows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_flow_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "load_traffic_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_from_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_traffic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "set_session_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extract_session_variable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_traffic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fuzz_endpoint",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replay_flow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_interception_rule",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "clear_rules",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_tools",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export_openapi_spec",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_api_patterns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detect_auth_pattern",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_scraper_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "f0db44b2a9edb6a0749289821a87c7ff97a42ebbaf225f60ea207e3defe45df8",
"stats": {
"tools": 25,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}