Vercel (mistertk) MCP Server
@mistertk/vercel-mcp
npm
v0.1.1
Published by @mistertk — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for Vercel API - provides 114+ tools, 4 resources, and 5 prompts for comprehensive Vercel platform management including deployments, domains, DNS, projects, teams, security, monitoring, and more
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([downloadArtifact]) co-exist with external-action tools ([createWebhook, deleteWebhook, getWebhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [downloadArtifact] → sinks [createWebhook, deleteWebhook, getWebhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow downloadArtifact → createWebhook
Tools 131
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
createWebhooknetwork egressdeleteWebhooknetwork egressdownloadArtifactingests untrusted inputgetWebhooknetwork egressaddBypassIpno sensitive capabilityaddProjectDomainno sensitive capabilityaddProjectMemberno sensitive capabilityartifactExistsno sensitive capabilityartifactQueryno sensitive capabilityassignAliasno sensitive capability
Show 121 more tools ↓
cancelDeploymentno sensitive capabilitycreateAccessGroupno sensitive capabilitycreateAccessGroupProjectno sensitive capabilitycreateAuthTokenno sensitive capabilitycreateCheckno sensitive capabilitycreateCustomEnvironmentno sensitive capabilitycreateDnsRecordno sensitive capabilitycreateEdgeConfigno sensitive capabilitycreateEdgeConfigTokenno sensitive capabilitycreateEnvVarno sensitive capabilitycreateEventno sensitive capabilitycreateLogDrainno sensitive capabilitycreateTeamno sensitive capabilitydeleteAccessGroupno sensitive capabilitydeleteAccessGroupProjectno sensitive capabilitydeleteAliasno sensitive capabilitydeleteAuthTokenno sensitive capabilitydeleteConfigurableLogDrainno sensitive capabilitydeleteConfigurationno sensitive capabilitydeleteCustomEnvironmentno sensitive capabilitydeleteDeploymentno sensitive capabilitydeleteDnsRecordno sensitive capabilitydeleteEdgeConfigno sensitive capabilitydeleteEdgeConfigSchemano sensitive capabilitydeleteEdgeConfigTokensno sensitive capabilitydeleteIntegrationLogDrainno sensitive capabilitydeleteTeamno sensitive capabilitydeleteTeamInviteCodeno sensitive capabilityeditEnvVarno sensitive capabilityexchangeSsoTokenno sensitive capabilitygetAccountInfono sensitive capabilitygetActiveAttackStatusno sensitive capabilitygetAliasno sensitive capabilitygetAllChecksno sensitive capabilitygetArtifactStatusno sensitive capabilitygetAuthTokenno sensitive capabilitygetAuthUserno sensitive capabilitygetBypassIpno sensitive capabilitygetCertByIdno sensitive capabilitygetCheckno sensitive capabilitygetConfigurationno sensitive capabilitygetConfigurationsno sensitive capabilitygetCustomEnvironmentno sensitive capabilitygetCustomEnvironmentsno sensitive capabilitygetDeploymentno sensitive capabilitygetDeploymentEventsno sensitive capabilitygetDeploymentFileContentsno sensitive capabilitygetDeploymentsno sensitive capabilitygetDomainno sensitive capabilitygetDomainConfigno sensitive capabilitygetEdgeConfigno sensitive capabilitygetEdgeConfigItemno sensitive capabilitygetEdgeConfigItemsno sensitive capabilitygetEdgeConfigsno sensitive capabilitygetEdgeConfigSchemano sensitive capabilitygetEdgeConfigTokenno sensitive capabilitygetEdgeConfigTokensno sensitive capabilitygetEnvVarno sensitive capabilitygetFirewallConfigno sensitive capabilitygetIntegrationLogDrainsno sensitive capabilitygetInvoiceno sensitive capabilitygetMemberno sensitive capabilitygetProjectDomainno sensitive capabilitygetProjectMembersno sensitive capabilitygetTeamno sensitive capabilitygetTeamAccessRequestno sensitive capabilitygetTeamMembersno sensitive capabilitygetTeamsno sensitive capabilitygetWebhooksno sensitive capabilitygitNamespacesno sensitive capabilityinviteUserToTeamno sensitive capabilityissueCertno sensitive capabilityjoinTeamno sensitive capabilitylistAccessGroupMembersno sensitive capabilitylistAccessGroupProjectsno sensitive capabilitylistAccessGroupsno sensitive capabilitylistAliasesno sensitive capabilitylistAuthTokensno sensitive capabilitylistDeploymentAliasesno sensitive capabilitylistDeploymentFilesno sensitive capabilitylistDnsRecordsno sensitive capabilitylistDomainsno sensitive capabilitylistEnvVarsno sensitive capabilitylistProjectDomainsno sensitive capabilitylistProjectsno sensitive capabilitylistUserEventsno sensitive capabilitypatchEdgeConfigSchemano sensitive capabilitypatchTeamno sensitive capabilityputFirewallConfigno sensitive capabilityreadAccessGroupno sensitive capabilityreadAccessGroupProjectno sensitive capabilityrecordArtifactEventsno sensitive capabilityremoveBypassIpno sensitive capabilityremoveCertno sensitive capabilityremoveEnvVarno sensitive capabilityremoveProjectDomainno sensitive capabilityremoveProjectMemberno sensitive capabilityremoveTeamMemberno sensitive capabilityrequestAccessToTeamno sensitive capabilityrequestDeleteno sensitive capabilityrerequestCheckno sensitive capabilitysearchRepono sensitive capabilitysubmitBillingDatano sensitive capabilitysubmitInvoiceno sensitive capabilityupdateAccessGroupno sensitive capabilityupdateAccessGroupProjectno sensitive capabilityupdateAttackChallengeModeno sensitive capabilityupdateCheckno sensitive capabilityupdateCustomEnvironmentno sensitive capabilityupdateDnsRecordno sensitive capabilityupdateEdgeConfigno sensitive capabilityupdateFirewallConfigno sensitive capabilityupdateInvoiceno sensitive capabilityupdateProjectno sensitive capabilityupdateProjectDomainno sensitive capabilityupdateResourceSecretsno sensitive capabilityupdateResourceSecretsByIdno sensitive capabilityupdateTeamMemberno sensitive capabilityuploadArtifactno sensitive capabilityuploadCertno sensitive capabilityverifyProjectDomainno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (131 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @mistertk/vercel-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Vercel 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
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