GitHub (Mission Squad) (missionsquad) MCP Server

@missionsquad/mcp-github npm v0.11.0

Published by @missionsquad — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Server for using the GitHub API.

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_pull_request_reviews → get_file_contents → create_issue. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow get_pull_request_reviews → get_file_contents → create_issue

Tools 74

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_issuenetwork egress
  • create_organization_webhooknetwork egress
  • create_pull_requestnetwork egress
  • create_pull_request_reviewnetwork egress
  • create_repository_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_organization_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_repository_webhooknetwork egress
  • get_file_contentsreads sensitive data
  • get_pull_request_filesreads sensitive data
  • get_pull_request_reviewsingests untrusted input
Show 64 more tools ↓
  • list_issue_commentsingests untrusted input
  • ping_organization_webhooknetwork egress
  • ping_repository_webhooknetwork egress
  • redeliver_organization_webhook_deliverynetwork egress
  • redeliver_repository_webhook_deliverynetwork egress
  • update_organization_webhooknetwork egress
  • update_organization_webhook_confignetwork egress
  • update_repository_webhooknetwork egress
  • update_repository_webhook_confignetwork egress
  • add_issue_commentno sensitive capability
  • create_branchno sensitive capability
  • create_commit_statusno sensitive capability
  • create_gistno sensitive capability
  • create_or_update_fileno sensitive capability
  • create_projectno sensitive capability
  • create_project_cardno sensitive capability
  • create_project_columnno sensitive capability
  • create_releaseno sensitive capability
  • create_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • create_tagno sensitive capability
  • delete_releaseno sensitive capability
  • dismiss_pull_request_reviewno sensitive capability
  • fork_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • get_combined_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_commit_statusesno sensitive capability
  • get_gistno sensitive capability
  • get_issueno sensitive capability
  • get_org_packageno sensitive capability
  • get_organization_webhookno sensitive capability
  • get_organization_webhook_configno sensitive capability
  • get_organization_webhook_deliveryno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_commentsno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_diffno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_review_commentsno sensitive capability
  • get_rate_limitno sensitive capability
  • get_release_assetno sensitive capability
  • get_repo_packageno sensitive capability
  • get_repository_webhookno sensitive capability
  • get_repository_webhook_configno sensitive capability
  • get_repository_webhook_deliveryno sensitive capability
  • get_user_packageno sensitive capability
  • list_commitsno sensitive capability
  • list_gistsno sensitive capability
  • list_issuesno sensitive capability
  • list_org_packagesno sensitive capability
  • list_organization_webhook_deliveriesno sensitive capability
  • list_organization_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • list_project_columnsno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_pull_requestsno sensitive capability
  • list_releasesno sensitive capability
  • list_repo_packagesno sensitive capability
  • list_repository_webhook_deliveriesno sensitive capability
  • list_repository_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • list_user_packagesno sensitive capability
  • push_filesno sensitive capability
  • search_codeno sensitive capability
  • search_issuesno sensitive capability
  • search_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • search_usersno sensitive capability
  • submit_pull_request_reviewno sensitive capability
  • update_issueno sensitive capability
  • upload_release_assetno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.11.0 latest A 93/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @missionsquad/mcp-github --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of GitHub (Mission Squad) 27

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 28 side by side →

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