Misp — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "misp-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "misp-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "misp-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 97,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([misp_fetch_feed]) co-exist with external-action tools ([misp_create_event, misp_publish_event]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "misp_fetch_feed → misp_create_event"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [misp_fetch_feed] → sinks [misp_create_event, misp_publish_event]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"misp_fetch_feed"
],
"sinks": [
"misp_create_event",
"misp_publish_event"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"misp_fetch_feed"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"misp_create_event",
"misp_publish_event"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "misp_search_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_get_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_create_event",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"publish_event\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "misp_update_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_publish_event",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"publish_event\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "misp_tag_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_search_attributes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_add_attribute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_add_attributes_bulk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_delete_attribute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_correlate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_get_related_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_describe_types",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_list_tags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_search_by_tag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_export_iocs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_export_hashes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_add_sighting",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_check_warninglists",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_list_object_templates",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_get_object_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_add_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_delete_object",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_list_galaxies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_get_galaxy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_search_galaxy_clusters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_attach_galaxy_cluster",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_list_feeds",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_toggle_feed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_fetch_feed",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "misp_cache_feed",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_list_organisations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_get_organisation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_server_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_list_sharing_groups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "misp_delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "ea1cf54c456a66c088f377e42438fd60223b948893c9af46e80d3ddcf7da51fb",
"stats": {
"tools": 36,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}