Misata MCP Server
misata
PyPI
v0.9.6.52
Published by rasinmuhammed — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Outcome-conformant synthetic data: realistic multi-table test data that hits the revenue curves, rates, and aggregates you declare, exactly. From a sentence, YAML, or your database. No ML model, no real data. MCP server for AI agents.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (misata/mutate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`misata/mutate.py:305`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l, str]: proc = subprocess.run( self._cmd("run", "--select", model, "--quiet"), capture_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server misata/mutate.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:365`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v or {}) return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "misata.cli", "generate", "--con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_enterprise_identities.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_enterprise_identities.py:284`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ,2\n3,4\n") r = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "misata.cli", "provenance", str(tmp_path)],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_enterprise_identities.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_evalpack.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_evalpack.py:157`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ir, copy) ok = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(copy / "verify.py")], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_evalpack.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_examples_run.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_examples_run.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pen a GUI result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(script)], cwd=tmp_path, env=env,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_examples_run.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_robustness.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_robustness.py:186`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ndex=False) r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "misata.cli", "audit", str(d)],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_robustness.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_schema_roundtrip_lint.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_schema_roundtrip_lint.py:250`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: *args): return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-m", "misata.cli", "lint", str(path), *args],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_schema_roundtrip_lint.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.6.52 latest |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.9.6.50 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.9.6.45 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.9.6.44 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.9.6.42 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.9.6.38 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.9.6.35 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.9.6.31 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.9.6.30 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.9.6.18 |
A 93/100 | 7 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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