@misarblog/mcp
npm
v5.1.2
Published by @misarblog — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Misar.Blog — publish blog posts, manage drafts, generate AI cover images, and access analytics from Claude Code, Cursor & Windsurf.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/login.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { saveConfig, getBaseUrl, tryGetApiKey } from "../lib/auth.js"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/login.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/upgrade.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { apiFetch } from "../lib/api-client.js"; import { formatError } from "..
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/upgrade.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_articleingests untrusted inputget_profileingests untrusted inputadd_reactionno sensitive capabilityadd_to_seriesno sensitive capabilitycreate_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_seriesno sensitive capabilitygenerate_cover_imageno sensitive capabilitygenerate_title_seono sensitive capabilityget_analytics_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_follow_statusno sensitive capabilityget_reactionsno sensitive capabilityget_seriesno sensitive capabilitylist_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_articlesno sensitive capabilitylist_newsletter_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_newsletter_subscribersno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilitypublish_articleno sensitive capabilityremove_reactionno sensitive capabilityresearch_topicno sensitive capabilitysearch_articlesno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitysuggest_titlesno sensitive capabilityupdate_articleno sensitive capabilityupgradeno sensitive capabilityupload_imageno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.1.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v5.0.4 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v2.0.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v1.0.6 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @misarblog/mcp --online
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