Mirror (glasslane-io) MCP Server
mirror-mcp
PyPI
v4.2.1
Published by glasslane-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/server.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/server.py:16`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: src.tools.chatbot_tools import ( chatbot_health_check ) from src.database import get_db_manager, get_vector_search_c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/server.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_ai_skills_simple.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_ai_skills_simple.py:32`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(module_name) print(f"✓ {module_name}") import_results.append(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_ai_skills_simple.py
Tools 103
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_token_discovery_queuereads sensitive dataget_token_holder_analysisreads sensitive dataget_token_regulatory_riskreads sensitive dataget_token_research_evidencereads sensitive dataget_token_validation_statusreads sensitive dataget_volume_leadersreads sensitive dataget_wallet_token_distributionreads sensitive datasearch_rss_vectoringests untrusted inputsecurity_get_token_scanreads sensitive dataweb_searchingests untrusted input
Show 93 more tools ↓
analyze_arbitrage_opportunityno sensitive capabilityanalyze_arbitrage_viabilityno sensitive capabilityanalyze_cex_signalsno sensitive capabilityanalyze_defi_protocolno sensitive capabilityanalyze_market_datano sensitive capabilityanalyze_nft_holder_distributionno sensitive capabilityanalyze_pool_momentumno sensitive capabilityanalyze_pool_performanceno sensitive capabilityanalyze_price_momentumno sensitive capabilityanalyze_token_securityno sensitive capabilityanalyze_wallet_transaction_patternsno sensitive capabilitycalculate_price_correlationno sensitive capabilitycalculate_price_statisticsno sensitive capabilitycheck_address_reputationno sensitive capabilitycmc_price_checkno sensitive capabilitycompare_dex_liquidityno sensitive capabilitycompare_spot_vs_futuresno sensitive capabilitycompare_token_fundamentalsno sensitive capabilitycompliance_get_documentno sensitive capabilitycompliance_search_documentsno sensitive capabilitycross_table_text_searchno sensitive capabilityfind_arbitrage_opportunitiesno sensitive capabilityfind_yield_opportunitiesno sensitive capabilityget_alert_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_binance_futures_datano sensitive capabilityget_binance_spot_datano sensitive capabilityget_block_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_cex_trading_signalsno sensitive capabilityget_contract_activity_statsno sensitive capabilityget_contract_source_codeno sensitive capabilityget_current_market_datano sensitive capabilityget_current_utc_timeno sensitive capabilityget_extended_token_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_high_risk_tokensno sensitive capabilityget_indicator_signalsno sensitive capabilityget_market_alertsno sensitive capabilityget_market_cap_rankingsno sensitive capabilityget_nft_access_policiesno sensitive capabilityget_nft_collection_statsno sensitive capabilityget_price_historyno sensitive capabilityget_regulation_conceptsno sensitive capabilityget_regulation_jurisdiction_scoresno sensitive capabilityget_regulation_obligationsno sensitive capabilityget_regulatory_guidanceno sensitive capabilityget_regulatory_timeline_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_security_address_riskno sensitive capabilityget_security_high_risk_addressesno sensitive capabilityget_security_pipeline_healthno sensitive capabilityget_security_scan_historyno sensitive capabilityget_security_service_statsno sensitive capabilityget_symbol_priceno sensitive capabilityget_technical_indicatorsno sensitive capabilityget_texts_categoriesno sensitive capabilityget_top_moversno sensitive capabilityget_trading_signals_dexno sensitive capabilityget_volatility_comparisonno sensitive capabilityget_wallet_nft_portfoliono sensitive capabilityget_wallet_portfolio_valueno sensitive capabilityget_whitepaper_benchmarksno sensitive capabilityget_whitepaper_comparisonsno sensitive capabilityget_whitepaper_discoveryno sensitive capabilityget_whitepaper_insightsno sensitive capabilityimmediate_security_scanno sensitive capabilityquery_defi_protocolsno sensitive capabilityquery_liquidity_poolsno sensitive capabilityresearch_analyze_patternsno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_audit_trailno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_caseno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_case_eventsno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_decision_historyno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_domain_scoresno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_evidenceno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_findings_by_tokenno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_issuer_analysisno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_policy_violationsno sensitive capabilityresearch_get_recommendationsno sensitive capabilityresearch_search_casesno sensitive capabilitysearch_defi_tokensno sensitive capabilitysearch_documents_vectorno sensitive capabilitysearch_texts_tableno sensitive capabilitysearch_tokens_by_validationno sensitive capabilitysecurity_add_watchlist_itemno sensitive capabilitysecurity_chatno sensitive capabilitysecurity_dismiss_alertno sensitive capabilitysecurity_get_alertsno sensitive capabilitysecurity_get_threat_feedno sensitive capabilitysecurity_get_watchlistno sensitive capabilitysend_chatbot_queryno sensitive capabilitysubmit_security_scan_batchno sensitive capabilitysubmit_security_scan_requestno sensitive capabilitytrack_tvl_changesno sensitive capabilitytrack_wallet_activity_timelineno sensitive capabilityverify_nft_ownershipno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (103 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.2.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 2 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan mirror-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Mirror 1
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