Minecraft Skills MCP Server

@minecraft-skills/mcp npm v0.1.8

Published by @minecraft-skills — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server exposing Minecraft Skills catalog lookups to AI agents.

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

high Tool "run_rcon_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "run_rcon_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool run_rcon_command

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([fetch_mojang_server_jar, fetch_data, fetch_resourcepack_assets, get_resourcepack_asset, search_vanilla_datapack_json_files, search_vanilla_datapack_json_content]) co-exist with external-action tools ([run_rcon_command]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [fetch_mojang_server_jar, fetch_data, fetch_resourcepack_assets, get_resourcepack_asset, search_vanilla_datapack_json_files, search_vanilla_datapack_j

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow fetch_mojang_server_jar → run_rcon_command

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_rcon_command"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "run_rcon_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool run_rcon_command · inputSchema.properties.command

low Mutating tool "run_rcon_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "run_rcon_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool run_rcon_command

Tools 140

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • fetch_dataingests untrusted input
  • fetch_mojang_server_jaringests untrusted input
  • fetch_resourcepack_assetsingests untrusted input
  • get_resourcepack_assetingests untrusted input
  • run_rcon_commandruns code / shell
  • search_vanilla_datapack_json_contentingests untrusted input
  • search_vanilla_datapack_json_filesingests untrusted input
  • analyze_minecraft_logno sensitive capability
  • analyze_minecraft_performanceno sensitive capability
  • authoring-checklists.jsonno sensitive capability
Show 130 more tools ↓
  • authoring-diagnostics.jsonno sensitive capability
  • authoring-guardrails.jsonno sensitive capability
  • authoring-recipes.jsonno sensitive capability
  • authoring-scenarios.jsonno sensitive capability
  • claim-policies.jsonno sensitive capability
  • classify_pack_filesno sensitive capability
  • clean_cacheno sensitive capability
  • compare_commandsno sensitive capability
  • compare_datapack_schemano sensitive capability
  • compare_paper_apino sensitive capability
  • compare_paper_api_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • compare_registry_entriesno sensitive capability
  • compare_vanilla_pathsno sensitive capability
  • compare_versionsno sensitive capability
  • create_rcon_configno sensitive capability
  • data-manifest.jsonno sensitive capability
  • explain_pack_pathno sensitive capability
  • fact-surfaces.jsonno sensitive capability
  • find_datapack_entriesno sensitive capability
  • find_resourcepack_assetsno sensitive capability
  • find_versions_by_pack_formatno sensitive capability
  • get_authoring_checklistno sensitive capability
  • get_authoring_contextno sensitive capability
  • get_authoring_diagnosticno sensitive capability
  • get_authoring_guardrailno sensitive capability
  • get_authoring_planno sensitive capability
  • get_authoring_preflightno sensitive capability
  • get_authoring_recipeno sensitive capability
  • get_authoring_scenariono sensitive capability
  • get_cache_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_claim_policyno sensitive capability
  • get_community_datasetno sensitive capability
  • get_coverage_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_data_manifestno sensitive capability
  • get_datapack_schema_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • get_evaluation_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_evidence_bundleno sensitive capability
  • get_fabric_toolchainno sensitive capability
  • get_fact_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • get_intent_lookupno sensitive capability
  • get_modrinth_resourceno sensitive capability
  • get_mojang_version_metadatano sensitive capability
  • get_output_requirementno sensitive capability
  • get_pack_file_schemano sensitive capability
  • get_pack_formatno sensitive capability
  • get_pack_migration_planno sensitive capability
  • get_paper_api_indexno sensitive capability
  • get_paper_api_referenceno sensitive capability
  • get_paper_api_surfaceno sensitive capability
  • get_paper_plugin_datano sensitive capability
  • get_rcon_config_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_resourcepack_assets_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_resourcepack_model_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_response_patternno sensitive capability
  • get_server_reportsno sensitive capability
  • get_skillno sensitive capability
  • get_source_policyno sensitive capability
  • get_source_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_source_tierno sensitive capability
  • get_support_matrixno sensitive capability
  • get_vanilla_datapack_jsonno sensitive capability
  • get_vanilla_inventoryno sensitive capability
  • get_verified_java_player_texturesno sensitive capability
  • get_versionno sensitive capability
  • inspect_blockbench_projectno sensitive capability
  • inspect_resourcepack_png_alpha_boundsno sensitive capability
  • intent-lookups.jsonno sensitive capability
  • latest_versionno sensitive capability
  • list_authoring_checklistsno sensitive capability
  • list_authoring_diagnosticsno sensitive capability
  • list_authoring_guardrailsno sensitive capability
  • list_authoring_recipesno sensitive capability
  • list_authoring_scenariosno sensitive capability
  • list_claim_policiesno sensitive capability
  • list_community_datasetsno sensitive capability
  • list_domainsno sensitive capability
  • list_fact_surfacesno sensitive capability
  • list_intent_lookupsno sensitive capability
  • list_modrinth_project_versionsno sensitive capability
  • list_output_requirementsno sensitive capability
  • list_pack_formatsno sensitive capability
  • list_pending_evaluationsno sensitive capability
  • list_referencesno sensitive capability
  • list_response_patternsno sensitive capability
  • list_skillsno sensitive capability
  • list_source_tiersno sensitive capability
  • list_version_supportno sensitive capability
  • list_versionsno sensitive capability
  • lookup_java_player_profileno sensitive capability
  • output-requirements.jsonno sensitive capability
  • record_tool_evaluationno sensitive capability
  • resolve_modrinth_compatibilityno sensitive capability
  • resolve_velocity_toolchainno sensitive capability
  • response-patterns.jsonno sensitive capability
  • search_allno sensitive capability
  • search_authoring_scenariosno sensitive capability
  • search_catalogno sensitive capability
  • search_commandsno sensitive capability
  • search_community_datasetsno sensitive capability
  • search_datapack_schemano sensitive capability
  • search_fabric_api_membersno sensitive capability
  • search_fabric_api_typesno sensitive capability
  • search_modrinth_projectsno sensitive capability
  • search_paper_eventsno sensitive capability
  • search_paper_membersno sensitive capability
  • search_paper_typesno sensitive capability
  • search_registry_entriesno sensitive capability
  • search_resourcepack_assetsno sensitive capability
  • search_resourcepack_modelsno sensitive capability
  • search_vanilla_pathsno sensitive capability
  • suggest_minecraft_lookupsno sensitive capability
  • target_versionno sensitive capability
  • taskno sensitive capability
  • use_minecraft_datapacksno sensitive capability
  • use_minecraft_paper_pluginsno sensitive capability
  • use_minecraft_resourcepacksno sensitive capability
  • validate_datapack_jsonno sensitive capability
  • validate_datapack_projectno sensitive capability
  • validate_fabric_modno sensitive capability
  • validate_mixin_configno sensitive capability
  • validate_modrinth_packno sensitive capability
  • validate_pack_filesno sensitive capability
  • validate_paper_plugin_jarno sensitive capability
  • validate_player_skin_layoutno sensitive capability
  • validate_resourcepack_pngno sensitive capability
  • validate_resourcepack_projectno sensitive capability
  • validate_resourcepack_translationsno sensitive capability
  • validate_server_access_listno sensitive capability
  • validate_server_propertiesno sensitive capability
  • validate_velocity_plugin_jarno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 3

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.8 latest A 93/100 4 1.13.0 2026-09-07
v0.1.6 A 93/100 4 1.13.0 2026-09-01
v0.1.5 A 93/100 4 1.13.0 2026-08-25

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MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @minecraft-skills/mcp --online

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