Minecraft Mod MCP Server
minecraft-mod-mcp
npm
v0.3.0
Source verified
Published by langyo — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server bridge & launcher CLI for Minecraft — connect AI tools to Minecraft via Model Context Protocol, launch and manage instances
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 12.9 = 87. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −12.9 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×6 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 87 − 6 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 20
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:3009`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js:1631`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; var cachedProxy; var proxyActive = false; function detectSystemProxy() { if (c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js:1121`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; var cachedProxy; var proxySetup = false; var proxyActive = false; function detec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:7321`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; var ModClient = class { modPort = null; baseUrl = ""; mcProcess = null;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.cjs:1727`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFile } = await import("child_process"); const { existsSync: fsExists } = await import("fs"); if (process.platform =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:67`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; // src/consts.ts var PORT_START = MCP.portStart; var PORT_END = MCP.portEnd; va
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server-A4GIZH75.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server-A4GIZH75.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; var MANIFEST_URL = DOWNLOAD.versionM
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server-A4GIZH75.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server-CT5BA47F.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server-CT5BA47F.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { spawn } from "child_process"; var MANIFEST_URL = DOWNLOAD.versionManife
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server-CT5BA47F.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/chunk-33QT6KSX.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-33QT6KSX.js:20`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch(`http://${MCP.bindAddress}:${port}${MOD.statusEndpoint}`, { signal: controller.signa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-33QT6KSX.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js:1175`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const apiResp = await fetch("https://api.github.com/repos/langyo/minecraft-mod-mcp/releases/latest", { headers:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/chunk-HRWYZQKF.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-HRWYZQKF.js:271`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const apiResp = await fetch("https://api.github.com/repos/langyo/minecraft-mod-mcp/releases/latest", { headers:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-HRWYZQKF.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js:1158`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch("https://piston-meta.mojang.com/", { method: "HEAD", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(8e3) });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.cjs)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.cjs:1232`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const apiResp = await fetch("https://api.github.com/repos/langyo/minecraft-mod-mcp/releases/latest", { headers:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.cjs
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:84`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch(`http://${MCP.bindAddress}:${port}${MOD.statusEndpoint}`, { signal: controller.signa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js:1774`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const serverOut = execSync(`reg query "${regBase}" /v ProxyServer`, { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-4DNIJZ7D.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js:1299`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; const serverOut = execSync(`reg query "${regBase}" /v ProxyServer`, { encoding: "utf-8", stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-V6WRGNQD.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:7408`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`taskkill /PID ${this.mcProcess.pid} /T /F`, { stdio: "ignore" }); } catch {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:221`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`taskkill /PID ${this.mcProcess.pid} /T /F`, { stdio: "ignore" }); } catch {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/server-A4GIZH75.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/server-A4GIZH75.js:186`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { const which = execSync(`${isWindows() ? "where" : "which"} ${gitExe}`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 5e3 }).tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server-A4GIZH75.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/server-CT5BA47F.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/server-CT5BA47F.js:179`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { const which = execSync(`${isWindows() ? "where" : "which"} ${gitExe}`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout: 5e3 }).tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server-CT5BA47F.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
B 81/100 | 20 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.2.1 |
B 81/100 | 20 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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