Slack — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@mindstone/mcp-server-slack",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@mindstone/mcp-server-slack"
},
"server": {
"name": "@mindstone/mcp-server-slack"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 97,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tokenProvider.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tokenProvider.js:363`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tokenProvider.js"
},
"evidence": "onse = await globalThis.fetch('https://slack.com/api/oauth.v2.access', { method: 'POST',",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/tokenProvider.js",
"line": 363,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"file_url\" on \"download_slack_file\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"download_slack_file\" takes a URL/host parameter \"file_url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "download_slack_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "file_url"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"url\" on \"get_slack_message_by_link\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"get_slack_message_by_link\" takes a URL/host parameter \"url\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "get_slack_message_by_link",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.url"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "url"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "authenticate_slack_workspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_slack_workspaces",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_slack_channels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_slack_channel_history",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "create_slack_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mark_slack_channel_as_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_slack_unread_messages",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "invite_user_to_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "download_slack_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "upload_slack_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_slack_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_slack_saved_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_slack_message_by_link",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "send_myself_a_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compose_slack_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "post_slack_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_slack_thread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "schedule_slack_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_scheduled_slack_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_scheduled_slack_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_slack_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_slack_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_slack_pins",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "pin_slack_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unpin_slack_message",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_slack_reaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remove_slack_reaction",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_slack_emoji",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_slack_thread_replies",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_slack_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_slack_user_profile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_user_by_email",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_email\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "open_slack_dm",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_slack_bookmark",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_slack_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_slack_reminders",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "complete_slack_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete_slack_reminder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_slack_bookmarks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "3a881041e51d8866b8313d10fc7647bb3fdc9edb162fdeebf57296a3a08b48f7",
"stats": {
"tools": 39,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}