Onda MCP Server

@mindfullabai/onda-mcp npm v0.5.1

Published by @mindfullabai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Onda terminal - control tabs, panes, terminals from AI agents

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 92/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 99 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−1.2 Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 21

high Tool "onda_pane_split" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "onda_pane_split" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "shell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool onda_pane_split

high Tool "onda_terminal_run" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "onda_terminal_run" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool onda_terminal_run

high Tool "onda_tab_new" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "onda_tab_new" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "shell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool onda_tab_new

high Tool "onda_tab_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "onda_tab_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool onda_tab_exec

high Tool "onda_workspace_add_terminal" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "onda_workspace_add_terminal" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "shell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool onda_workspace_add_terminal

high Tool "onda_terminal_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "onda_terminal_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool onda_terminal_spawn

high Tool "onda_agent_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "onda_agent_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool onda_agent_spawn

high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/install-skill.mjs)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`bin/install-skill.mjs:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); const target = resol

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server bin/install-skill.mjs

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:384`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: TH-resolvable binary to spawn (e.g., "claude", "/usr/local/bin/aider").' }, args: {

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/index.js

medium Unconstrained command parameter "shell" on "onda_pane_split"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "onda_pane_split" takes a command-shaped parameter "shell" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool onda_pane_split · inputSchema.properties.shell

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "onda_terminal_run"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "onda_terminal_run" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool onda_terminal_run · inputSchema.properties.command

medium Unconstrained command parameter "shell" on "onda_tab_new"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "onda_tab_new" takes a command-shaped parameter "shell" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool onda_tab_new · inputSchema.properties.shell

medium Unconstrained command parameter "shell" on "onda_workspace_add_terminal"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "onda_workspace_add_terminal" takes a command-shaped parameter "shell" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool onda_workspace_add_terminal · inputSchema.properties.shell

low Mutating tool "onda_pane_split" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "onda_pane_split" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool onda_pane_split

low Mutating tool "onda_terminal_run" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "onda_terminal_run" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool onda_terminal_run

low Mutating tool "onda_tab_new" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "onda_tab_new" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool onda_tab_new

low Mutating tool "onda_tab_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "onda_tab_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool onda_tab_exec

low Mutating tool "onda_workspace_add_terminal" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "onda_workspace_add_terminal" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool onda_workspace_add_terminal

low Mutating tool "onda_terminal_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "onda_terminal_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool onda_terminal_spawn

low Mutating tool "onda_agent_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "onda_agent_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool onda_agent_spawn

low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010

"@mindfullabai/onda-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.

Evidence: node scripts/install-skill.mjs --quiet || true

Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.

Location: package @mindfullabai/onda-mcp

Tools 43

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • onda_agent_spawnruns code / shell
  • onda_pane_splitruns code / shell
  • onda_tab_execruns code / shell
  • onda_tab_newruns code / shell
  • onda_terminal_runruns code / shell
  • onda_terminal_spawnruns code / shell
  • onda_workspace_add_terminalruns code / shell
  • onda_agent_closeno sensitive capability
  • onda_agent_promptno sensitive capability
  • onda_agent_waitno sensitive capability
Show 33 more tools ↓
  • onda_app_infono sensitive capability
  • onda_contextno sensitive capability
  • onda_launch_sessionno sensitive capability
  • onda_pane_closeno sensitive capability
  • onda_pane_focusno sensitive capability
  • onda_pane_listno sensitive capability
  • onda_pingno sensitive capability
  • onda_statusno sensitive capability
  • onda_tab_closeno sensitive capability
  • onda_tab_focusno sensitive capability
  • onda_tab_listno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_killno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_listno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_listenersno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_pollno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_readno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_sendno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_send_keysno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_subscribeno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_unsubscribeno sensitive capability
  • onda_terminal_wait_forno sensitive capability
  • onda_window_focusno sensitive capability
  • onda_window_listno sensitive capability
  • onda_window_mount_workspaceno sensitive capability
  • onda_window_newno sensitive capability
  • onda_window_screenshotno sensitive capability
  • onda_workspace_createno sensitive capability
  • onda_workspace_focusno sensitive capability
  • onda_workspace_layoutno sensitive capability
  • onda_workspace_listno sensitive capability
  • onda_workspace_locateno sensitive capability
  • onda_workspace_tileno sensitive capability
  • onda_workspace_unmountno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.5.1 latest A 92/100 21 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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