Mimirs MCP Server
mimirs
npm
v1.8.0
Published by thewinci — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Persistent project memory for AI coding agents — semantic search, AST-aware chunking, dependency graphs, and conversation history
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/config/index.ts)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/config/index.ts:139`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: x", "**/*.p12", "**/id_rsa", "**/id_dsa", "**/id_ecdsa", "**/id_ed25519", "**/.npmrc", "**/.pgpass", "**/.netrc"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/config/index.ts
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/cli/index.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/index.ts:58`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: [--dir D] Run A/B eval (with/without RAG) [--top N] [--out F] mimirs map [dir] [--focus F]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/index.ts
medium Tool "remove_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "remove_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "remove_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool remove_file
low Mutating tool "remove_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "remove_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool remove_file
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
remove_filewrites filesaffectedno sensitive capabilityannotateno sensitive capabilitycalleesno sensitive capabilityco_changeno sensitive capabilityconnect_repono sensitive capabilitycreate_checkpointno sensitive capabilitydelete_annotationno sensitive capabilitydependentsno sensitive capabilitydepends_onno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
file_historyno sensitive capabilityget_annotationsno sensitive capabilitygit_contextno sensitive capabilityimpactno sensitive capabilityindex_filesno sensitive capabilityindex_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_checkpointsno sensitive capabilityproject_mapno sensitive capabilityread_conversationno sensitive capabilityread_relevantno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_analyticsno sensitive capabilitysearch_checkpointsno sensitive capabilitysearch_commitsno sensitive capabilitysearch_conversationno sensitive capabilitysearch_symbolsno sensitive capabilityserver_infono sensitive capabilitytraceno sensitive capabilityusagesno sensitive capabilitywikino sensitive capabilitywrite_relevantno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.7.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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