Shopify (miller-joe) MCP Server

@miller-joe/shopify-mcp npm v0.2.0 Source verified

Published by miller-joe — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

MCP server for Shopify — Admin API tooling plus AI-driven product creation via ComfyUI image generation.

Trust grade
A
97/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 97/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 97/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_fulfillment_order, get_fulfillment, get_metaobject]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_fulfillment_order, get_fulfillment, get_metaobject] → sinks [create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_fulfillment_order → create_webhook

Tools 62

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • get_fulfillmentingests untrusted input
  • get_fulfillment_orderingests untrusted input
  • get_metaobjectingests untrusted input
  • update_webhooknetwork egress
  • add_product_optionsno sensitive capability
  • add_products_to_collectionno sensitive capability
  • add_tagsno sensitive capability
  • bulk_regenerate_imagesno sensitive capability
Show 52 more tools ↓
  • cancel_fulfillmentno sensitive capability
  • cancel_orderno sensitive capability
  • complete_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • create_collectionno sensitive capability
  • create_customerno sensitive capability
  • create_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • create_fulfillmentno sensitive capability
  • create_metaobjectno sensitive capability
  • create_orderno sensitive capability
  • create_productno sensitive capability
  • create_variantsno sensitive capability
  • delete_collectionno sensitive capability
  • delete_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • delete_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • delete_metaobjectno sensitive capability
  • delete_variantsno sensitive capability
  • generate_and_create_productno sensitive capability
  • generate_product_imageno sensitive capability
  • get_collectionno sensitive capability
  • get_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • get_orderno sensitive capability
  • get_productno sensitive capability
  • get_webhookno sensitive capability
  • list_collectionsno sensitive capability
  • list_customersno sensitive capability
  • list_draft_ordersno sensitive capability
  • list_fulfillment_ordersno sensitive capability
  • list_locationsno sensitive capability
  • list_metafieldsno sensitive capability
  • list_metaobject_definitionsno sensitive capability
  • list_metaobjectsno sensitive capability
  • list_ordersno sensitive capability
  • list_productsno sensitive capability
  • list_variantsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • refine_product_imageno sensitive capability
  • refund_orderno sensitive capability
  • remove_products_from_collectionno sensitive capability
  • remove_tagsno sensitive capability
  • reorder_variantsno sensitive capability
  • run_shopifyql_queryno sensitive capability
  • set_inventory_quantityno sensitive capability
  • set_metafieldno sensitive capability
  • update_collectionno sensitive capability
  • update_customerno sensitive capability
  • update_draft_orderno sensitive capability
  • update_fulfillment_trackingno sensitive capability
  • update_metaobjectno sensitive capability
  • update_orderno sensitive capability
  • update_productno sensitive capability
  • update_variantsno sensitive capability
  • upload_product_imageno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.2.0 latest A 97/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 97/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @miller-joe/shopify-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Shopify 14

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 15 side by side →

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