Plane (mikey-semy) MCP Server
@mikey-semy/plane-mcp
npm
v0.1.1
Published by @mikey-semy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Plane MCP Server - Python implementation with NPM wrapper for easy usage
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/plane-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/plane-mcp.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirname, join } from 'path';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/plane-mcp.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/install-python.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/install-python.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import { dirname, join } from 'path';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/install-python.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@mikey-semy/plane-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node ./scripts/install-python.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @mikey-semy/plane-mcp
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_issuenetwork egresscreate_issue_typenetwork egressadd_cycle_issuesno sensitive capabilityadd_issue_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_module_issuesno sensitive capabilitycreate_cycleno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_moduleno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_stateno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
create_worklogno sensitive capabilitydelete_cycleno sensitive capabilitydelete_cycle_issueno sensitive capabilitydelete_issueno sensitive capabilitydelete_issue_typeno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_moduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_module_issueno sensitive capabilitydelete_stateno sensitive capabilitydelete_worklogno sensitive capabilityget_current_userno sensitive capabilityget_cycleno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_issue_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_issue_details_by_readable_idno sensitive capabilityget_issue_typeno sensitive capabilityget_issue_using_readable_identifierno sensitive capabilityget_issue_worklogsno sensitive capabilityget_labelno sensitive capabilityget_moduleno sensitive capabilityget_projectsno sensitive capabilityget_stateno sensitive capabilityget_total_worklogsno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_cycle_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_cyclesno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_module_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_modulesno sensitive capabilitylist_project_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_statesno sensitive capabilitytransfer_cycle_issuesno sensitive capabilityupdate_cycleno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_issue_typeno sensitive capabilityupdate_labelno sensitive capabilityupdate_moduleno sensitive capabilityupdate_stateno sensitive capabilityupdate_worklogno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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