Midas MCP Server
midas-mcp
npm
v5.45.6
Published by christiancattaneo — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Golden Code methodology - everything you vibecode turns to gold
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11.7 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11.7 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×4 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 7 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 16
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:242`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec } = await import('child_process'); const openCmd = process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'open' :
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/claude-code.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/claude-code.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import { join } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/claude-code.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { loadState, setPhase } from './state/phase.js'; import { startProject }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cursor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cursor.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { logger } from './logger.js'; // =======================================
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cursor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/github-integration.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/github-integration.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { detectPhaseFromArtifacts } from './phase-detector.js'; import { sanitiz
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/github-integration.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/phase-detector.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/phase-detector.js:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { discoverDocsSync } from './docs-discovery.js'; import { getGatesStatus
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/phase-detector.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/pilot.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/pilot.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { randomBytes } from 'crypto'; import { isAuthenticated, getAuthenticated
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/pilot.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/cleanup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/cleanup.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { sanitizePath, isShellSafe } from '../security.js'; import { logEvent }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/cleanup.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/completeness.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/completeness.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; // ============================================================================
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/completeness.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/grow.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/grow.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { sanitizePath } from '../security.js'; import { loadState, saveState, cr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/grow.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:55`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://github.com/login/device/code', { method: 'POST', headers:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/vuln-scan.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/vuln-scan.js:434`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${encodeURIComponent(pkg)}`, { method: 'HEAD',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/vuln-scan.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/auth.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/auth.js:245`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 'xdg-open'; exec(`${openCmd} ${flow.verificationUri}`); } catch { // Silent fail
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/auth.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cursor.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cursor.js:109`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = execSync(`sqlite3 "${dbPath}" "${query}"`, { encoding: 'utf-8', maxBuffer: 50 * 1024 * 1024 } //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cursor.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/grow.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/grow.js:206`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: to; const log = execSync(`git log ${range} --pretty=format:"%H|%s|%ai" --no-merges`, { cwd: projectP
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/grow.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/scope.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/scope.js:183`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const filesAtStart = execSync(`git ls-tree -r --name-only ${firstCommit}`, { cwd: projectPath, encoding: 'utf8' })
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/scope.js
Tools 56
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
midas_advance_phaseno sensitive capabilitymidas_analyzeno sensitive capabilitymidas_archive_cycleno sensitive capabilitymidas_auditno sensitive capabilitymidas_cancel_hotfixno sensitive capabilitymidas_changelogno sensitive capabilitymidas_check_docsno sensitive capabilitymidas_check_scope_creepno sensitive capabilitymidas_cleanup_suggestionno sensitive capabilitymidas_clear_taskno sensitive capability
Show 46 more tools ↓
midas_complete_hotfixno sensitive capabilitymidas_completenessno sensitive capabilitymidas_complexityno sensitive capabilitymidas_cost_reportno sensitive capabilitymidas_detect_project_typeno sensitive capabilitymidas_enforce_advanceno sensitive capabilitymidas_gameplan_analyzeno sensitive capabilitymidas_gameplan_progressno sensitive capabilitymidas_get_phaseno sensitive capabilitymidas_get_providerno sensitive capabilitymidas_get_stuckno sensitive capabilitymidas_horizonno sensitive capabilitymidas_hotfix_statusno sensitive capabilitymidas_journal_listno sensitive capabilitymidas_journal_saveno sensitive capabilitymidas_journal_searchno sensitive capabilitymidas_list_providersno sensitive capabilitymidas_next_cycleno sensitive capabilitymidas_oneshotno sensitive capabilitymidas_preflightno sensitive capabilitymidas_preflight_updateno sensitive capabilitymidas_record_errorno sensitive capabilitymidas_record_fixno sensitive capabilitymidas_retrospectiveno sensitive capabilitymidas_scan_debtno sensitive capabilitymidas_set_api_keyno sensitive capabilitymidas_set_phaseno sensitive capabilitymidas_set_providerno sensitive capabilitymidas_set_scope_baselineno sensitive capabilitymidas_set_taskno sensitive capabilitymidas_show_exampleno sensitive capabilitymidas_simplifyno sensitive capabilitymidas_smart_suggestno sensitive capabilitymidas_start_hotfixno sensitive capabilitymidas_start_projectno sensitive capabilitymidas_suggest_promptno sensitive capabilitymidas_tornadono sensitive capabilitymidas_unstuckno sensitive capabilitymidas_update_taskno sensitive capabilitymidas_validate_gameplanno sensitive capabilitymidas_validate_gatesno sensitive capabilitymidas_validate_planningno sensitive capabilitymidas_validate_prdno sensitive capabilitymidas_verifyno sensitive capabilitymidas_verify_deployno sensitive capabilitymidas_vuln_scanno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (56 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.45.6 latest |
B 81/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan midas-mcp --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.