microsandbox-mcp
npm
v0.6.17
Published by superradcompany — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for microsandbox — manage microVM sandboxes from any AI agent
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tool "sandbox_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec
Tool "sandbox_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_shell
Tool "sandbox_exec_start" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_start
Tool "sandbox_exec_poll" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_poll
Tool "sandbox_exec_write_stdin" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_write_stdin
Tool "sandbox_exec_signal" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_signal
Tool "sandbox_exec_close" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_close
Tool "sandbox_ssh_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool sandbox_ssh_exec
Tool "sandbox_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec
Tool "sandbox_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_shell
Tool "sandbox_exec_start" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_start
Tool "sandbox_exec_poll" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_poll
Tool "sandbox_exec_write_stdin" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_write_stdin
Tool "sandbox_exec_signal" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_signal
Tool "sandbox_exec_close" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_exec_close
Tool "sandbox_ssh_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool sandbox_ssh_exec
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
sandbox_execruns code / shellsandbox_exec_closeruns code / shellsandbox_exec_pollruns code / shellsandbox_exec_signalruns code / shellsandbox_exec_startruns code / shellsandbox_exec_write_stdinruns code / shellsandbox_shellruns code / shellsandbox_ssh_execruns code / shellimage_inspectno sensitive capabilityimage_listno sensitive capabilityimage_pruneno sensitive capabilityimage_removeno sensitive capabilityruntime_checkno sensitive capabilityruntime_installno sensitive capabilitysandbox_createno sensitive capabilitysandbox_drainno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_copyno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_copy_from_hostno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_copy_to_hostno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_existsno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_listno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_mkdirno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_readno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_removeno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_renameno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_statno sensitive capabilitysandbox_fs_writeno sensitive capabilitysandbox_inspectno sensitive capabilitysandbox_listno sensitive capabilitysandbox_logs_readno sensitive capabilitysandbox_logs_streamno sensitive capabilitysandbox_metricsno sensitive capabilitysandbox_metrics_allno sensitive capabilitysandbox_metrics_streamno sensitive capabilitysandbox_removeno sensitive capabilitysandbox_runno sensitive capabilitysandbox_sftp_mkdirno sensitive capabilitysandbox_sftp_readno sensitive capabilitysandbox_sftp_readlinkno sensitive capabilitysandbox_sftp_realpathno sensitive capabilitysandbox_sftp_removeno sensitive capabilitysandbox_sftp_renameno sensitive capabilitysandbox_sftp_symlinkno sensitive capabilitysandbox_sftp_writeno sensitive capabilitysandbox_startno sensitive capabilitysandbox_statusno sensitive capabilitysandbox_stopno sensitive capabilitysandbox_waitno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_createno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_inspectno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_listno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_loadno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_reindexno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_removeno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_saveno sensitive capabilitysnapshot_verifyno sensitive capabilityvolume_createno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_copyno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_existsno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_listno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_mkdirno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_readno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_removeno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_renameno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_statno sensitive capabilityvolume_fs_writeno sensitive capabilityvolume_inspectno sensitive capabilityvolume_listno sensitive capabilityvolume_removeno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.6.17 latest |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v0.6.16 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v0.6.15 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v0.6.14 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.6.13 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v0.6.12 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v0.6.10 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v0.6.9 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
v0.6.8 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.6.7 |
A 93/100 | 16 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan microsandbox-mcp --online
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