Microsandbox MCP Server

microsandbox-mcp npm v0.6.17

Published by superradcompany — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for microsandbox — manage microVM sandboxes from any AI agent

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 16

high Tool "sandbox_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "sandbox_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool sandbox_exec

high Tool "sandbox_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "sandbox_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool sandbox_shell

high Tool "sandbox_exec_start" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "sandbox_exec_start" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_start

high Tool "sandbox_exec_poll" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "sandbox_exec_poll" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_poll

high Tool "sandbox_exec_write_stdin" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "sandbox_exec_write_stdin" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_write_stdin

high Tool "sandbox_exec_signal" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "sandbox_exec_signal" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_signal

high Tool "sandbox_exec_close" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "sandbox_exec_close" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_close

high Tool "sandbox_ssh_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "sandbox_ssh_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool sandbox_ssh_exec

low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "sandbox_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool sandbox_exec

low Mutating tool "sandbox_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "sandbox_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool sandbox_shell

low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec_start" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "sandbox_exec_start" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_start

low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec_poll" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "sandbox_exec_poll" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_poll

low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec_write_stdin" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "sandbox_exec_write_stdin" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_write_stdin

low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec_signal" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "sandbox_exec_signal" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_signal

low Mutating tool "sandbox_exec_close" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "sandbox_exec_close" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool sandbox_exec_close

low Mutating tool "sandbox_ssh_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "sandbox_ssh_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool sandbox_ssh_exec

Tools 69

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • sandbox_execruns code / shell
  • sandbox_exec_closeruns code / shell
  • sandbox_exec_pollruns code / shell
  • sandbox_exec_signalruns code / shell
  • sandbox_exec_startruns code / shell
  • sandbox_exec_write_stdinruns code / shell
  • sandbox_shellruns code / shell
  • sandbox_ssh_execruns code / shell
  • image_inspectno sensitive capability
  • image_listno sensitive capability
Show 59 more tools ↓
  • image_pruneno sensitive capability
  • image_removeno sensitive capability
  • runtime_checkno sensitive capability
  • runtime_installno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_createno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_drainno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_copyno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_copy_from_hostno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_copy_to_hostno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_existsno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_listno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_mkdirno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_readno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_removeno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_renameno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_statno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_fs_writeno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_inspectno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_listno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_logs_readno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_logs_streamno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_metricsno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_metrics_allno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_metrics_streamno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_removeno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_runno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_sftp_mkdirno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_sftp_readno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_sftp_readlinkno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_sftp_realpathno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_sftp_removeno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_sftp_renameno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_sftp_symlinkno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_sftp_writeno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_startno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_statusno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_stopno sensitive capability
  • sandbox_waitno sensitive capability
  • snapshot_createno sensitive capability
  • snapshot_inspectno sensitive capability
  • snapshot_listno sensitive capability
  • snapshot_loadno sensitive capability
  • snapshot_reindexno sensitive capability
  • snapshot_removeno sensitive capability
  • snapshot_saveno sensitive capability
  • snapshot_verifyno sensitive capability
  • volume_createno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_copyno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_existsno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_listno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_mkdirno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_readno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_removeno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_renameno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_statno sensitive capability
  • volume_fs_writeno sensitive capability
  • volume_inspectno sensitive capability
  • volume_listno sensitive capability
  • volume_removeno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 10

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.6.17 latest A 93/100 16 1.13.0 2026-09-09
v0.6.16 A 93/100 16 1.13.0 2026-09-04
v0.6.15 A 93/100 16 1.13.0 2026-08-29
v0.6.14 A 93/100 16 1.12.1 2026-08-24
v0.6.13 A 93/100 16 1.12.1 2026-08-22
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.6.12 A 93/100 16 1.12.1 2026-08-21
v0.6.10 A 93/100 16 1.12.1 2026-08-19
v0.6.9 A 93/100 16 1.12.1 2026-08-18
v0.6.8 A 93/100 16 1.12.1 2026-08-15
v0.6.7 A 93/100 16 1.12.1 2026-07-29

Embed this score

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MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan microsandbox-mcp --online

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