Microbit Claude — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.10.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.10.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "microbit-claude-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "microbit-claude-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "microbit-claude-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/makecode.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/makecode.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/makecode.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const PXT_BIN = process.env.PXT_BIN ?? \"pxt\"; const",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/makecode.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const help_desk_1 = require(\"./help-desk\"); const ma",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 9,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/makecode.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/makecode.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/makecode.js"
},
"evidence": "require(\"path\")); const child_process_1 = require(\"child_process\"); const PXT_BIN = process.env.PXT_BIN ?? \"pxt\"; const",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/makecode.js",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (build/help-desk.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/help-desk.js:126`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/help-desk.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\", headers",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "build/help-desk.js",
"line": 126,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/help-desk.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/help-desk.js:126`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/help-desk.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\", headers",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/help-desk.js",
"line": 126,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "validate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_sources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "write_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "append_source",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "makecode_validate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "makecode_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "makecode_write",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "makecode_build",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "makecode_init",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_help",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_requests",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "review_request",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_response",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "1109b762789c45b9a98c1642a0b52b91b5f1c9d41c3f2ab1d950632912e76dd5",
"stats": {
"tools": 16,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}