Vcf Orchestrator MCP Server
@mgovedarov/mcp-vcf-orchestrator
npm
v2.2.1
Source verified
Published by mgovedarov — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "create-action" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "create-action" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool create-action
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "create-action"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "create-action" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool create-action · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "create-action" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create-action" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create-action
Tools 75
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create-actionruns code / shelladd-action-to-project-packageno sensitive capabilityadd-configuration-to-project-packageno sensitive capabilityadd-resource-to-project-packageno sensitive capabilityadd-workflow-to-project-packageno sensitive capabilitycollect-context-snapshotno sensitive capabilitycreate-configurationno sensitive capabilitycreate-deploymentno sensitive capabilitycreate-packageno sensitive capabilitycreate-subscriptionno sensitive capability
Show 65 more tools ↓
create-templateno sensitive capabilitycreate-workflowno sensitive capabilitydelete-actionno sensitive capabilitydelete-configurationno sensitive capabilitydelete-deploymentno sensitive capabilitydelete-packageno sensitive capabilitydelete-resource-elementno sensitive capabilitydelete-subscriptionno sensitive capabilitydelete-templateno sensitive capabilitydelete-workflowno sensitive capabilitydiff-action-fileno sensitive capabilitydiff-workflow-fileno sensitive capabilityensure-project-packageno sensitive capabilityexport-action-fileno sensitive capabilityexport-configuration-fileno sensitive capabilityexport-packageno sensitive capabilityexport-project-packageno sensitive capabilityexport-resource-elementno sensitive capabilityexport-workflow-fileno sensitive capabilityget-actionno sensitive capabilityget-catalog-itemno sensitive capabilityget-configurationno sensitive capabilityget-deploymentno sensitive capabilityget-packageno sensitive capabilityget-package-import-detailsno sensitive capabilityget-project-package-import-detailsno sensitive capabilityget-subscriptionno sensitive capabilityget-templateno sensitive capabilityget-workflowno sensitive capabilityget-workflow-executionno sensitive capabilityget-workflow-execution-logsno sensitive capabilityimport-action-fileno sensitive capabilityimport-configuration-fileno sensitive capabilityimport-packageno sensitive capabilityimport-project-packageno sensitive capabilityimport-resource-elementno sensitive capabilityimport-workflow-fileno sensitive capabilitylist-actionsno sensitive capabilitylist-catalog-itemsno sensitive capabilitylist-categoriesno sensitive capabilitylist-configurationsno sensitive capabilitylist-deployment-actionsno sensitive capabilitylist-deploymentsno sensitive capabilitylist-event-topicsno sensitive capabilitylist-packagesno sensitive capabilitylist-pluginsno sensitive capabilitylist-resource-elementsno sensitive capabilitylist-subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylist-templatesno sensitive capabilitylist-workflow-executionsno sensitive capabilitylist-workflowsno sensitive capabilitylist-workflows-by-categoryno sensitive capabilitypreflight-action-fileno sensitive capabilitypreflight-configuration-fileno sensitive capabilitypreflight-packageno sensitive capabilitypreflight-workflow-fileno sensitive capabilityprepare-artifact-promotionno sensitive capabilityrebuild-project-packageno sensitive capabilityrun-deployment-actionno sensitive capabilityrun-workflowno sensitive capabilityrun-workflow-and-waitno sensitive capabilityscaffold-workflow-fileno sensitive capabilityupdate-configurationno sensitive capabilityupdate-resource-elementno sensitive capabilityupdate-subscriptionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (75 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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