Mapx MCP Server
@mgamil/mapx
npm
v0.3.5
Source verified
Published by mohamedgamil — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 10 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:1539`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const openCmd = process.platform === "win32" ? "start" : process.platform
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/git-tracker.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/git-tracker.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; function getGitBlobHashes(repoRoot) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/git-tracker.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/store-bun.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/store-bun.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eign_keys = ON"); } exec(sql) { this.db.exec(sql); } prepare(sql) { let cached = this.stmtCache.get(sql)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/store-bun.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/store-node.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/store-node.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eign_keys = ON"); } exec(sql) { this.db.exec(sql); } prepare(sql) { let cached = this.stmtCache.get(sql)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/store-node.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/exporters/svg-exporter.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/exporters/svg-exporter.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { DotExporter } from "./dot-exporter.js"; class SvgExporter { store;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/exporters/svg-exporter.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/languages/installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/languages/installer.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url); const __dirname = dirname(__f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/languages/installer.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:1541`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: en" : "xdg-open"; exec(`${openCmd} ${url}`).unref(); } }); program.command("metrics").description("Show co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/languages/installer.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/languages/installer.js:10`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: destPath) { try { execSync(`curl -L -s -f -o "${destPath}" "${url}"`, { stdio: "ignore" }); if (existsSync(des
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/languages/installer.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/core/graph.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/graph.js:189`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: aph(repo); cg.graph.import(data); return cg; } fileNodeId(filePath) { return `file://${filePath}`; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/graph.js
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mapx_nodeingests untrusted inputmapx_searchingests untrusted inputmapx_agents_generateno sensitive capabilitymapx_batchno sensitive capabilitymapx_calleesno sensitive capabilitymapx_callersno sensitive capabilitymapx_clustersno sensitive capabilitymapx_contextno sensitive capabilitymapx_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitymapx_dsmno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
mapx_edgesno sensitive capabilitymapx_explainno sensitive capabilitymapx_exportno sensitive capabilitymapx_filesno sensitive capabilitymapx_hooksno sensitive capabilitymapx_impactno sensitive capabilitymapx_lang_installno sensitive capabilitymapx_lang_listno sensitive capabilitymapx_lang_uninstallno sensitive capabilitymapx_layersno sensitive capabilitymapx_metricsno sensitive capabilitymapx_profileno sensitive capabilitymapx_queryno sensitive capabilitymapx_routesno sensitive capabilitymapx_scanno sensitive capabilitymapx_sinksno sensitive capabilitymapx_smellsno sensitive capabilitymapx_sourcesno sensitive capabilitymapx_statusno sensitive capabilitymapx_syncno sensitive capabilitymapx_traceno sensitive capabilitymapx_workspacesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.5 latest |
B 81/100 | 9 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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