@metrxbot/mcp-server
npm
v0.2.5
Source verified
Published by metrxbots — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Metrx MCP Server — AI agent cost intelligence tools for LLM agents. Track spend, optimize models, manage budgets, detect waste, and prove ROI.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/auth.js:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); const { platform } = process; const cmd = platform === 'darwin' ? `open
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/auth.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:161`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { await fetch('https://metrxbot.com/api/telemetry/demo', { method: 'POST', heade
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
"@metrxbot/mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.cjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @metrxbot/mcp-server
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
acknowledge_alertno sensitive capabilityapply_optimizationno sensitive capabilityattribute_taskno sensitive capabilitycompare_modelsno sensitive capabilityconfigure_alert_thresholdno sensitive capabilitycreate_model_experimentno sensitive capabilitygenerate_roi_auditno sensitive capabilityget_agent_detailno sensitive capabilityget_alertsno sensitive capabilityget_attribution_reportno sensitive capabilityget_budget_statusno sensitive capabilityget_cost_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_experiment_resultsno sensitive capabilityget_failure_predictionsno sensitive capabilityget_optimization_recommendationsno sensitive capabilityget_task_roino sensitive capabilityget_upgrade_justificationno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilityroute_modelno sensitive capabilityrun_cost_leak_scanno sensitive capabilityset_budgetno sensitive capabilitystop_experimentno sensitive capabilityupdate_budget_modeno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @metrxbot/mcp-server --online
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