Device MCP Server
@metamask/device-mcp
npm
v0.3.0
Source verified
Published by metamask — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/adb-backend.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/adb-backend.cjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eAttributes; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const promises_1 = require("node:fs/promises");
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/backends/adb-backend.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/adb-backend.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/adb-backend.mjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { ACCEPT_LABELS, DENY_LABELS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/backends/adb-backend.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/idb-backend.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/idb-backend.cjs:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pIdbElement; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const promises_1 = require("node:fs/promises");
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/backends/idb-backend.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/idb-backend.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/idb-backend.mjs:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eCb, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { ACCEPT_LABELS, DENY_LABELS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/backends/idb-backend.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/exec.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/exec.cjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ndAvailable; const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); /** * Execute a command and return stdout/stde
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/exec.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/exec.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/exec.mjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; /** * Execute a command and return stdout/stderr/exitCode. * Rejects only on s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/exec.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/platform.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/platform.mjs:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = await exec('idb', ['describe', '--udid', deviceId]); if (result.exitCode === 0) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/platform.mjs
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
device_app_stateno sensitive capabilitydevice_clipboardno sensitive capabilitydevice_close_appno sensitive capabilitydevice_contextno sensitive capabilitydevice_dismiss_alertno sensitive capabilitydevice_dismiss_keyboardno sensitive capabilitydevice_generate_locatorsno sensitive capabilitydevice_get_alert_textno sensitive capabilitydevice_get_element_textno sensitive capabilitydevice_get_window_sizeno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
device_infono sensitive capabilitydevice_list_devicesno sensitive capabilitydevice_logsno sensitive capabilitydevice_long_pressno sensitive capabilitydevice_open_appno sensitive capabilitydevice_press_buttonno sensitive capabilitydevice_screen_recordingno sensitive capabilitydevice_screenshotno sensitive capabilitydevice_scroll_to_elementno sensitive capabilitydevice_select_deviceno sensitive capabilitydevice_snapshotno sensitive capabilitydevice_swipeno sensitive capabilitydevice_tap_coordinatesno sensitive capabilitydevice_tap_elementno sensitive capabilitydevice_typeno sensitive capabilitydevice_wait_forno sensitive capabilityhermes_cdpno sensitive capabilityhermes_targetsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v0.2.0 |
A 100/100 | 9 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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