Agentic Cli MCP Server
@metamask/agentic-cli
npm
v5.0.1
Published by @metamask — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 7
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js:3`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/chunks/lib-CSIem1pp.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunks/lib-CSIem1pp.js:21`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Function(`
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunks/lib-CSIem1pp.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js:3`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunks/browserFlow-BHy6uUmT.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunks/browserFlow-BHy6uUmT.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunks/browserFlow-BHy6uUmT.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunks/execAsync-D-pATxXk.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunks/execAsync-D-pATxXk.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunks/execAsync-D-pATxXk.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunks/lib.cjs-E2sLV5YM.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/chunks/lib-CSIem1pp.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunks/lib-CSIem1pp.js:78`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import(a)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunks/lib-CSIem1pp.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.0.1 latest |
B 85/100 | 7 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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