@meshy-ai/meshy-mcp-server
npm
v0.5.1
Published by @meshy-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Meshy AI 3D generation platform
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/slicer-detector.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import * as fs from "fs"; import * as path from "path"; import { SlicerType, MUL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/slicer-detector.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/slicer-detector.js:126`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = execSync(`which ${entry.linuxExe}`, { timeout: 2000, encoding: "utf-8" }).trim(); if (re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/slicer-detector.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
meshy_convertingests untrusted inputmeshy_creative_labingests untrusted inputmeshy_download_modelingests untrusted inputmeshy_get_task_statusingests untrusted inputmeshy_list_modelsingests untrusted inputmeshy_process_multicoloringests untrusted inputmeshy_send_to_sliceringests untrusted inputmeshy_uv_unwrapingests untrusted inputmeshy_analyze_printabilityno sensitive capabilitymeshy_animateno sensitive capabilitymeshy_cancel_taskno sensitive capabilitymeshy_check_balanceno sensitive capabilitymeshy_image_to_3dno sensitive capabilitymeshy_image_to_imageno sensitive capabilitymeshy_list_tasksno sensitive capabilitymeshy_multi_image_to_3dno sensitive capabilitymeshy_remeshno sensitive capabilitymeshy_repair_printabilityno sensitive capabilitymeshy_resizeno sensitive capabilitymeshy_retextureno sensitive capabilitymeshy_rigno sensitive capabilitymeshy_text_to_3dno sensitive capabilitymeshy_text_to_3d_refineno sensitive capabilitymeshy_text_to_imageno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.1 latest |
B 83/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v0.4.0 |
B 83/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @meshy-ai/meshy-mcp-server --online
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
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