Safaricom Daraja MCP Server
@meshark/safaricom-daraja-mcp
npm
v1.0.1
Published by @meshark — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Safaricom Daraja API integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Tool "daraja_c2b_simulate" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "daraja_c2b_simulate" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool daraja_c2b_simulate
high Tool "daraja_b2c_payment" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "daraja_b2c_payment" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool daraja_b2c_payment
high Tool "daraja_b2b_payment" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "daraja_b2b_payment" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool daraja_b2b_payment
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "daraja_c2b_simulate"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "daraja_c2b_simulate" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool daraja_c2b_simulate · inputSchema.properties.command_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "daraja_b2c_payment"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "daraja_b2c_payment" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool daraja_b2c_payment · inputSchema.properties.command_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "daraja_b2b_payment"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "daraja_b2b_payment" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool daraja_b2b_payment · inputSchema.properties.command_id
low Mutating tool "daraja_c2b_simulate" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "daraja_c2b_simulate" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool daraja_c2b_simulate
low Mutating tool "daraja_b2c_payment" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "daraja_b2c_payment" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool daraja_b2c_payment
low Mutating tool "daraja_b2b_payment" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "daraja_b2b_payment" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool daraja_b2b_payment
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
daraja_b2b_paymentruns code / shelldaraja_b2c_paymentruns code / shelldaraja_c2b_simulateruns code / shelldaraja_account_balanceno sensitive capabilitydaraja_c2b_registerno sensitive capabilitydaraja_generate_qrno sensitive capabilitydaraja_generate_tokenno sensitive capabilitydaraja_reversalno sensitive capabilitydaraja_stk_pushno sensitive capabilitydaraja_stk_queryno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
daraja_transaction_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @meshark/safaricom-daraja-mcp --onlineMore in Business & CRM
Free public tax reference data — GST/VAT, income, company and capital-gains tax rules for 50+ countries.
The approval gate for unattended UCP buying agents — a policy/approval MCP proxy in front of a merchant's UCP checkout endpoint.
Autotask PSA MCP server. Generic entity query/get/create/update across the full REST API plus convenience tools for tickets, companies, contacts, projects, tasks and time entries. AI-safe with readonly mode and destructive-action confirmation. stdio + opt
MCP server for B2C Commerce developer experience tools
Search, compare and contact real-world companies through a public MCP business directory.
Norwegian business register (Brønnøysundregistrene) as an MCP server — companies, roles, subunits and annual accounts, with the register's silent traps encoded as guards.