Memorymaster MCP Server
memorymaster
PyPI
v4.8.5
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Production-grade memory reliability system for AI coding agents. Lifecycle-managed claims with citations, conflict detection, steward governance, and MCP integration.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/bridges/local_search/everything.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/bridges/local_search/everything.py:142`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( args, capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/bridges/local_search/everything.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/bridges/local_search/provider.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/bridges/local_search/provider.py:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rror. - Never use ``shell=True`` in subprocess calls. - Respect ``limit`` and ``kind`` filters on a best-effort
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/bridges/local_search/provider.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/core/llm_provider.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/core/llm_provider.py:365`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [bin_path, "--version"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/core/llm_provider.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/dreaming/providers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/dreaming/providers.py:132`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) process = subprocess.Popen( command, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/dreaming/providers.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/govern/claim_verifier.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/govern/claim_verifier.py:60`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["rg", "-l", "--type-add", "code:*.{ts,js,py,tsx,jsx,go,rs}", "-t",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/govern/claim_verifier.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/govern/jobs/staleness.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/govern/jobs/staleness.py:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [ "git", "log", "--oneline", "--since", since_iso,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/govern/jobs/staleness.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/govern/scheduler.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/govern/scheduler.py:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry: root_proc = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(resolved), "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/govern/scheduler.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/govern/steward.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/govern/steward.py:1513`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(resolved), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], captu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/govern/steward.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/stores/snapshot.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/stores/snapshot.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(resolved), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], captu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/stores/snapshot.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (memorymaster/surfaces/dashboard.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`memorymaster/surfaces/dashboard.py:749`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self._operator_proc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server memorymaster/surfaces/dashboard.py
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
archive_by_sourceno sensitive capabilitycheckpointno sensitive capabilityclassify_queryno sensitive capabilitycompact_memoryno sensitive capabilitydream_statusno sensitive capabilityentity_statsno sensitive capabilityextract_entitiesno sensitive capabilityfederated_queryno sensitive capabilityfind_related_claimsno sensitive capabilityforgetno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
forget_previewno sensitive capabilityget_usage_rollupno sensitive capabilityimproveno sensitive capabilityingest_claimno sensitive capabilityingest_ruleno sensitive capabilityinit_dbno sensitive capabilitylist_claimsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_steward_proposalsno sensitive capabilitylocal_searchno sensitive capabilityopen_dashboardno sensitive capabilitypin_claimno sensitive capabilityquality_scoresno sensitive capabilityquery_claim_pathsno sensitive capabilityquery_for_contextno sensitive capabilityquery_for_taskno sensitive capabilityquery_memoryno sensitive capabilityquery_meta_decisionsno sensitive capabilityquery_rulesno sensitive capabilityread_active_tasksno sensitive capabilityrecallno sensitive capabilityrecall_analysisno sensitive capabilityrecall_statsno sensitive capabilityrecompute_tiersno sensitive capabilityredact_claim_payloadno sensitive capabilityrememberno sensitive capabilityresolve_projectno sensitive capabilityresolve_steward_proposalno sensitive capabilityrules_exportno sensitive capabilityrun_cycleno sensitive capabilityrun_stewardno sensitive capabilitysearch_verbatimno sensitive capabilitysession_scope_bindno sensitive capabilitysession_scope_clearno sensitive capabilitysession_scope_showno sensitive capabilityskill_exportno sensitive capabilityskill_inputsno sensitive capabilityskill_proposeno sensitive capabilityskill_recallno sensitive capabilityskill_reviewno sensitive capabilityvolunteer_contextno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.8.5 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v4.8.4 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v4.8.3 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v4.7.6 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v4.7.5 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v4.7.2 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v4.6.0 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v4.5.0 |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan memorymaster --online --registry pypiMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.